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A REAPPRAISAL OF LIABILITY FOR UNAUTHORIZED
MEDICAL TREATMENT*
ALLAN H. McCoxn**
INTRODUCTION

In March, 1904, Anna Mohr had an earache. From such an

inauspicious beginning grew a law suit which was to cost one doctor
$14,322.50,' and to establish a precedent for the liability of any
doctor who went beyond the limits of the explicit consent of his
patient in rendering medical treatment.
"Malpractice" on the part of doctors- has been defined in various
terms :
Any professional misconduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in professional or fiduciary duties, evil practice, or illegal
or immoral conduct . . . professional misconduct towards a
patient which is considered reprehensible either because immoral
in itself or because contrary to law or expressly forbidden by
law... bad, wrong, or injudicious treatment of a patient, professionally and in respect to the particular disease or injury, resulting in injury, unnecessary suffering, or death to the patient,
and proceeding from ignorance, carelessness, want of proper
professional skill, disregard of established rules or principles,
heglect, or malicious or criminal intent.3
.. the wrongful or improper practice of medicine, which results
in injury to the patient. 4
*

.
the failure upon the part of a physician or dentist properly
to perform the duty which devolves upon him in his professional
*The author wishes to express his appreciation for the comments of Dr.
Albert Mowlem and Dr. Russell Eilers of the University of Minnesota Hos-

pitals in connection with tlus study. At the same time, he wishes to state that
the conclusions, and any medical errors, are entirely his own.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W 12 (1905).
2. Because the various cases of unauthorized medical treatment and malpractice involve physicians, surgeons, dentists, chiropractors, and osteopaths,
the term "doctor" is used to cover anyone who may be classified as legally
entitled to practice in any branch of the healing arts. While this may not be
technically correct in all cases, the author believes that this generalized term
may be used in such a study.
3. Black, Law Dictionary 1111 (4th ed. 1951).
4. Gonzales, Vance, Helpern and Umberger, Legal Medicine: Pathology
and Toxicology 917 (2d ed. 1954).
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relation to his patient, a failure which results in some injury to
the patient.5
The treatment of a case by a surgeon or physician in a manner
contrary to accepted rules and with injurious results to the
patient, hence, any professional misconduct or any unreasonable
lack of skill or fidelity in the performance of professional or
fiduciary duties. 6
Most frequently, however, medical malpractice is thought of in
terms of the failure of a physician, surgeon or dentist to comply with
the standard of conduct established by the reasonable and ordinary
practice of doctors of the same system or school of practice and in
the same general locality as the doctor under consideration. 7 So
defined, malpractice appears to be only a specialized form of negligence, substituting for the "reasonable and prudent man" the hypothetical individual who might be called "the reasonable and competent doctor," and requiring that the standard of care or deviation
5. Regan, Doctor and Patient and the Law 17 (3d ed. 1956).
6. Merriam-Webster New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1953).
7
See, e.g., Napier v. Greenzweig, 256 Fed. 196, 197 (2d Cir. 1919)
"The law is well established that a surgeon or physician attending a patient
is bound by his contract to possess and to give the case such reasonable and
ordinary skill and diligence as surgeons and physicians in similar localities

and in the same general line of practice ordinarily exercise in like cases."
Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753, 205 P.2d 3, 5 (1949) "The standard
against which the acts of a physician are to be measured
is not the highest
skill medical science knows; 'the law exacts of physicians and surgeons in the

practice of their profession only that they possess and exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised
by members of their profession under similar circumstances.'", Adkins v.
Ropp, 105 Ind. App. 331, 334, 14 N.E.2d 727, 728 (1938) "When a physician
and surgeon assumes to treat and care for a patient, in the absence of a
special agreement, he is held in law to have impliedly contracted that he
possesses the reasonable and ordinary qualifications of his profession and that
he will exercise at least reasonable skill, diligence and care in his treatment
of him.
In determining whether the physician or surgeon has exercised
the degree of care and skill which the law requires, regard must be had to
the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment and in the
locality in which the physician or surgeon practices.", Nelson v. Nicollet

Clinic, 201 Minn. 505, 509, 276 N.W 801, 803 (1937)

"A physician or stir-

geon is only required to possess and exercise the degree of skill and learning
ordinarily possessed by members of his school of the profession in good
standing and to apply that skill and learning with reasonable care and diligence
and his best judgment.", Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 654, 194 Pac. 488.
491 (1920) "[The physician] assumes toward the patient the obligation to
exercise such reasonable care and skill
as is usually exercised by phystcians or surgeons of good standing, of the same system or school of practice
in the community in which he resides, having due regard to the condition of
medical and surgical science at that time." Prosser, Torts 133 (2d ed.
1955) , 41 Am. Jur., Physicians and Surgeons § 82 (1942) Sonic jurisdictions do not place controlling weight on the locality, particularly where
communication of new developments and access to modern facilities are
available without undue burden on the doctor. See, e.g., Sinz v. Owens, supra,
Viita v. Fleming, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W 1077 (1916), Prosser, Torts 134
(2d ed. 1955).
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therefrom be established through the -use of -expert witnesses s
except in the most extreme cases. 9 It is this form of malpractice
which most frequently occupies the courts' time in litigation between
patient and doctor; and it is undoubtedly this form of malpractice
claim against which most doctors seek to protect themselves by resort to malpractice insurance.
Somewhat removed from this general area of "negligent malpractice" lies a group of cases which appear on first glance to involve
something more than a mere unintentional deviation from a general
standard of care. The most familiar example of this type of malpractice is the case of an unauthorized operation, i.e., an operation
performed without the consent of the patient. Courts dealing with
this type of unauthorized medical treatment frequently speak in
terms of "assault and battery."' 0
The classification of the claim as one for "assault and battery"
has many possible effects. In contrast to the requirement in negligent
malpractice cases that medical experts be used to establish the basic
standard of conduct or deviation therefrom,," the plaintiff in an
assault and battery action may rely entirely on non-expert testi8. See, e.g., Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 (S.D. Ohio 1897). Stallcup

v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 282 P. 2d 791 (1955) ; Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d
749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949) ; Perkins v. Trueblood, 180 Cal. 437, 181 Pac. 642
(1919), Slimak v. Foster, 106 Conn. 366, 138 Ad. 153 (1927) ; Foster v.
Thornton, 113 Fla. 600, 152 So. 667 (1934) ; Snearly v. McCarthy 180 Iowa
81, 161 N.W. 108 (1917), Pettigrew v. Lewis, 46 Kan. 78, 2 Pac. 458
(1891); Meador v. Arnold, 264 Ky. 378, 94 S.W.2d 626 (1936), Sawyer v.
Berthold, 116 Minn. 441, 134 N.W 120 (1912); Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont.
645, 194 Pac. 488 (1920); Beane v. Perley, 99 N.H. 309, 109 A.2d 848
(1954), Hall v. Blume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (1944); Gallagher v.
Kermott, 56 N.D. 176, 216 N.W. 569 (1927), Modrzynski v. Lust, 88 N.E.2d
76 (Ohio App. 1949) ; Willet v. Johnson, 13 Okla. 563, 76 Pac. 174 (1904) ;
Lippold v. Kidd, 126 Ore. 160, 269 Pac. 210 (1928) ; Bigney v. Fisher, 26 ILL
402, 59 Ad. 72 (1904) ; Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257 (1931) ;
Sheldon v. Wright, 80 Vt. 298, 67 Aft. 807 (1907), Wurdemann v. Barnes,
92 Wis. 206, 66 N.W. 111 (1896).
9. Where the alleged negligence involves such misconduct as leaving a
sponge in the patient's body, Laughlin v. Christensen, 1 F.2d 215 (8th Cir.
1924) ; Funk v. Bonham, 204 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312 (1932) ; Fredrickson v.
Maw, 119, Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951); or removing the wrong tooth,
Ambrosi v. Monks, 85 A.2d 188 (D.C. Mun. App. 1951); Steinke v. Bell, 32"
N.J. Super. 67, 107 A.2d 825 (1954), or a badly set arm, McMillen v.
Foncannon, 127 Kan. 573, 274 Pac. 237 (1929), the courts are likely to say
that the question is one upon which even non-expert testimony is sufficient.
10. See. e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941),
Moos v. United States, 118 F Supp. 275, 276 (D. Minn. 1954). aff'd, 225
F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir. 1955), Cady v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 255, 222 P.2d
422, 424 (1950) ("trespass on the person") ; Mohr v. Williams, 95 Mfinn. 261,
271, 104 N.W. 12, 16, 1 L.ILA. (n.s.) 439, 445 (1905), Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) ;
Physicians' & Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 40, 111
P.2d 568, 569 (1941) ; Marshall v. Curry, (1933) 3 D.L.R. 260, 276, 60 Can.
Crim. Cas. 136, 153 (Nov. Scot Sup. Ct. 1933).
11. See notes 8 and 9 stpra.
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mony, particularly his own. In a battery action there is no need to
show any actual physical injury, the mere invasion of the plaintiff's
right to be free from unwarranted touching being sufficient to establish damages.12 It is also more likely that the defendant in a battery
action will be subjected to exemplary or punitive damages than if
the action is one for negligence. 13 On the other hand, the plaintiff
whose case is characterized as one for battery may find himself subjected to a much shorter period of limitations than is applied to
an action for negligent malpractice, 14 or may find that he is unable to
bring an action against the federal government under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for injuries incurred in a veterans' hospital. 1
There is even some suggestion that if the claim is made for an
unauthorized operation it is so inconsistent with a claim for negligence that the two may not be maintained in the same action.' 0 But
the most significant factor to the doctor is likely to be that as defendant in a battery action, he will be unable to rely upon expert
testimony that he has in fact complied with the standard of care
normally exercised by reasonable physicians. 17 It should be noted,
12. See Prosser, Torts 31-32 (2d ed. 1955), Restatement, Torts § 18
(1934) Although it is usual for the plaintiff in these actions to allege and
recover for "pain and suffering," there is no particular attempt in most of
the cases to differentiate between the pain and suffering incident to the original condition and that which is solely the result of the unauthorized treatment.
But cf. Paulsen v. Gundersen, 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W 448 (1935). Nominal
damages are allowed in the unauthorized operation cases. See Church v. Adler,
350 Ill. App. 471, 483, 113 N.E.2d 327, 332 (1953), Butler v. Molinski, 198
Tenn. 124, 131, 277 S.W.2d 448, 451 (1955)
13. Generally, mere negligence is not enough basis for imposition of
punitive damages. 2 Harper & James, Torts 1300 (1956) , McCormick, Damages 280-81 (1935) , Prosser, Torts 9-10 (2d ed. 1955). In Gill v. Selling, 125
Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812, 58 A.L.R. 1556 (1928), the court says that there can
be no-recovery of punitive damages in the absence of evidence of bad motive
or utter disregard for the welfare of the patient. Cf. Butler v. Molinski, 198
Tenn. 124, 131, 277 S.W.2d 448, 451 (1955).
14. See, e.g., Marshall v. Curry, (1933) 3 D.L.R. 260, 60 Cail. Crim.
Cas. 136 (Nov. Scot. Sup. Ct. 1933) But see Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo.
72, 266 P 2d 1095 (1954), Hershey v. Peake, 115 Kan. 562, 223 Pac. 1113
(1924) , McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 Atl. 124 (1930) , Burke v. Maryland, 149 Minn. 481, 184 N.W 32 (1921), Physicians' & Dentists' Business
Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111 P.2d 568 (1941).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1952) specifically exempts from the provisions
of the Federal Tort Claims Act "any claim arising out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." This
has been applied to an unauthorized operation in Moos v. United States, 118
F Supp. 275 (D.Minn. 1954), aff'd, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955).
16. Cady v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 222 P.2d 422 (1950). But cf. Wood
v. Wyeth, 106 App. Div. 21, 94 N.Y. Supp. 360 (2d Dep't 1905), Physicians'
& Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111 P.2d 568 (1941).
17 Perry v. Hodgson, 168 Ga. 678, 148 S.E. 659 (1929) , Tabor v.
Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1952), Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363,
228 N.W 681 (1930)
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however, that in many cases where there has in fact been no
authorization for the medical treatment, the courts have not followed
a strict "battery" theory and have sometimes spoken of the case as
not distinguishable from other forms of malpractice.1 8
The present study deals with the unauthorized medical treatment form of malpractice. The basic inquiry is whether there is a
real distinction between "negligent" malpractice and unauthorized
treatment or whether the same standard of conduct may be applied
in all cases involving improper action on the part of doctors. The
older decisions described and analyzed in this study have been classified in other discussions dealing with the necessity for consent to an
operation. 9 The present study will place little emphasis on the
question of whose consent is necessary, although it should be noted
that when the patient is a minor or mentally incapacitated 2' the
18. In particular, see McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 Adt. 124

(1930) ; Physicians' & Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111
P2d 568 (1941) ; Wellman v. Drake, 130 W.Va. 229, 43 S.E2d 57 (1947).
In the discussion which follows many other cases will be mentioned which

talk in terms of "negligence" in relation to unauthorized operations.
19. See Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of
Surgery, 14 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 233 (1942) ; Notes, Civil Liability of Physcians and Surgeons for MAalpractice, 35 Minin. L. Rev. 186 (1951), Conseat
as a Prerequisite to a Surgical Operation, 14 U. Cin. L. Rev. 161 (1940).
20. The general rule is that the consent of the parent is necessary in
order to operate on a minor, Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C Cir. 1941)
(15 year old boy submitted to serious plastic surgery) ; Rogers v. Sells, 178
Okla. 103, 61 P.2d 1018 (1936) (14 year old's foot amputated after auto accident); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920) (11 year
old died under anaesthetic in preparation for removal of tonsils and adenoids),
Restatement, Torts § 59 (1934). Cf. Perry v. Hodgson, 168 Ga. 678, 148 S.E.
659 (1929) (18 year old submits to operation on leg after agreement between
doctor and father). However, the doctor has been allowed to operate with only
the minor's consent where the minor is capable of understanding the nature
of the operation and the risk involved. Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211
N.W. 75 (1926) (19 year old consented to removal of tonsils and administration of local anaesthetic from which he died) ; Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich.
632, 108 N.W. 94, 7 L.R.A. (n.s.) 612 (1906) (17 year old consented to
removal of tumor and administration of anaesthetic under which he died),
Gulf & S.L R.R. v. Sullivan, 155 Miss. 1, 119 So. 501, 62 A.L.R. 191 (1928)
(17 year old consented to vaccination), Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25 (Ohio
1956) (18 year old consented to plastic surgery on nose), Restatement, Torts
§ 59 (1934). Or if the circumstances create an emergency in which immediate
treatment is necessary and the consent of the parent is impracticable to obtain,
the doctor may operate or render medical assistance. Jackovach v. Yocum,
212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444, 76 A.L.R. 551 (1931) (minor fell from train,
had long scalp wound, two or three inches in length, was bleeding profusely,
had crushed elbow joint, and compound, comminuted facture; arm amputated
after consultation of doctors); Wells v. McGehee, 39 So2d 196 (La.
App. 1949) (child had broken arm, effort made to call mother at place of
work before administering anaesthetic, under which child died), Luka
v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W 1106, 41 IRA. (n.s.) 290 (1912)
(child knocked down by train and thrown under wheels resulting in crushing of left foot, compound disarticulation of bones of foot, with principal
bones tom away and flesh crushed and torn from top of foot leaving muscles,
ligaments and bone exposed; child unconscious with weak pulse and foot cold
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consent of a parent or guardian may be necessary On the other
hand, if the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of understanding the situation or of communicating consent to treatment in
the particular situation, the consent of a spouse 2 2 or some other

duly authorized representative 3 may be sufficient to protect the
physician or surgeon rendering medical treatment. There may also
be question as to whether the consent of the patient's spouse is required where the operation or treatment will have the effect of interfering with conjugal rights or privileges .2 4 The major divisions of
and dead before foot amputated), Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279
N.Y. Supp. 575 (N.Y. City Ct. Bronx Co. 1935) (20 year old's foot or ankle
injured and set without father's knowledge) , Ollet Pittsburgh, C.C. & St.
L. Ry., 201 Pa. 361, 50 At. 1010 (1902) (17 year old's foot crushed in railroad accident; he was taken to doctor against his will). There is some basis
for arguing that where the parent refused to grant consent, the courts may
make it possible to give medical treatment on the ground that the child is
neglected. See People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d
769 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) , In re Seiferth, 285 App. Div.
221, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dep't 1955), In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263
N.Y. Supp. 552 (2d Dep't 1933), Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in
the Practice of Surgery, 14 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 233, 247 (1942) But see In re
Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942), where there was no statutory
provision.
21. See Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953), Pratt v.
Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
22. See Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943),
Rothe v. Hull, 352 Mo. 926, 180 S.W.2d 7 (1944).
23. See Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of
Surgery, 14 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 233, 248 (1942), Restatement, Torts § 59
(1934) In Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W 12, 1 L.R.A. (n.s.) 439
(1905), the defendant argued that the presence of the patient's family physi-

cian in

the operating room and his apparent acquiescence in the operation
should satisfy this theory of consent, but the court said, "It is not claimed that
he gave his express consent. It is not disputed but that the family physician of
plaintiff was present on the occasion of the operation, and at her request.
But the purpose of his presence was not that lie might participate in the operation, nor does it appear that he was authorized to consent to any change
in the one originally proposed to be made. Plaintiff was naturally nervous
and fearful of the consequences of being placed under the influence of
anaesthetics, and the presence of her family physician was required under
the impression that it would allay and calm her fears. The evidence made
the question one of fact for the jury to determine." While in Bennan v.
Parsonnet, 93 N.J.L. (54 Vroom) 20, 83 At. 948 (1912), the court reasoned
that in view of the fact that the patient was unconscious and therefore incapable of giving consent during the operation, it was imperative that some
representative be able to act, "to represent him in those matters affecting his
The surgeon whom
welfare concerning which he cannot act for himself.
the patient himself has selected alone fills all of these requirements, and
hence upon him the law should cast the responsibilities of this office by the
legal implication that the patient intended him to act for him when lie had
made no other selection." In Keister v. O'Neil, 59 Cal. App. 2d 428, 138
P.2d 723 (1943), the consent of the plaintiff's mother-in-law was conceded
to be binding upon the plaintiff, probably because both the plaintiff and her
husband were minors.
24. See Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liabilitv in the Practice of
It is fairly clear
Surgery, 14 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 233, 280-84 (1942)
that there is normally no necessity for a spouse to consent where the patient
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the present study are :(a) The development of the traditional statement of the law as to a doctor's liability for unauthorized medical
treatment, (b) an analysis of the cases involving such unauthorized
treatment in terms of the conduct of the doctor and its consequences,
and (c) an evaluation of the variations found in the cases in terms
of how the law may best give adequate protection to both the patient
and the doctor.
GENERAL BACKGROUND

The American law regarding civil liability for unauthorized
medical treatment seems to have had its formulation in four cases
decided in four different jurisdictions shortly after the beginning of
this century :25 Mohr v. Williams,20 Pratt v. Davis,2 7 Rolater v.
"
2
Strain,
8 and Scidoendorff v. Society of New York Hospital.
Anna Mohr consulted Dr. Williams, a specialist in disorders of
is adult and mentally competent. E.g., Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33,
224 P.2d 808 (1950); Burroughs v. Crichton, 48 App. D.C. 596, 4 A.L.R.
1529 (D.C. Ct App. 1919), State to the Use of Janney . Housekeeper, 70
Md. 162, 16 Atl. 382, 2 L.R.A. 587 (1889), M'Clallen v. Adams, 19 Pick.
333, 31 Am. Dec. 140 (Mass. 1837), Carstens v. Hanselman, 61 Mich. 426, 28
N.W. 159 (1886). There have been several recent cases in which the spouse
has been granted a right of recovery for loss of consortium. See Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (wife recovers) ; Gist v. French,
136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003 (1955) (husband recovers for injuries
done to wife by series of operations), Acuff v. Schmit, 78 NAV-2d 480 (Iowa
1956) (wife recovers for negligent injury to husband). But cf. Rosenberg v.
Feigin, 119 Cal. App. 2d 783, 260 P,2d 143 (1953) (husband not allowed to
recover for inducement of rmscarriage), Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite
Co., 247 Minn. 515, 77 NAV.2d 641 (1956) (expressing doubt as to the
Hitaffer doctrine, although barring recovery by wife on basis of WVorkmen's
Compensation Act) ; Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647,
70 NAV.2d 205 (1955) (denying wife's recovery for loss of consortium). The
author of the note in 14 U. Cin. L. Rev. 161, 170-72, 180 (1940), concluded
that the consent of the spouse was not necessary, but noted tlmt if the patient
had a cause of action the spouse might also have a cause of action for damages for infringement of right of consortium and loss of services.
25. These are not the earliest cases in which a doctor %wascharged with
having performed an operation without the consent of the patient. The earliest
reported case appears to be Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 2 Wils. K.B. 359,
95 Eng. Rep. 860 (1767), but the court there treated the action of the two
"surgeons" in rebreaking the patient's broken and improperly mended leg
more as negligent conduct than as an assault. Some earlier American decisions, such as State to the Use of Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 AfU.
382, 2 L.R.A. 587 (1889), dealing with the requirement of consent on the
part of the plaintiff's husband, Sullivan v. McGraw, 118 Mich. 39, 76 N.W.
149 (1898), speaking in terms of negligence rather than lack of consent: and
Wood v. Wyeth, 106 App. Div. 21, 94 N.Y. Supp. 360 (2d Dep't 1905), in
which the question of an operation without consent is avoided, do not
squarely raise the question of the extent of or existence of liability based
solely on lack of consent of the patient.
26. 95 Minr. 261, 104 NAV 12, 1 L.R.A. (n.s.) 439 (1905).
27 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562, 7 L.R.A. (n.s.) 609 (1906).
28. 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96, 50 L.R.A. (n.s.) 880 (1913).
29. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
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the ear, complaining of trouble in her right ear. Dr. Williams examined both her ears, but was unable to make a complete diagnosis of
the left ear due to foreign substances in it. He concluded on the
basis of the examination that the bones of the right ear were diseased
and advised an operation, to which the patient consented. Upon
closer examination, under anaesthetic, the doctor discovered that the
condition of the right ear was not so serious, but that the left ear was
seriously diseased. He operated on the left ear. Mrs. Mohr sued,
claiming that the operation impaired greatly the hearing in the left
ear. In spite of evidence that the operation was skillfully performed
and that it was probably beneficial,3" the court held that the operation on the left ear was not authorized and constituted an assault
and battery The court based its decision upon "the right of inviolability of [her] person [which] necessarily forbids a physician or
surgeon, however skillful or eminent
to violate without permission the bodily integrity of his patient by a major or capital operation.
"31 At the same time, the court recognized that there might
be instances in which a doctor should be permitted to operate
without the express consent of the patient. The most obvious of
these was the situation in which the patient was unconscious and
his injuries required immediate surgical or medical attention. In
such a case, the court said, the doctor might proceed using his own
best judgment "and consent on the part of the injured person would
be implied.1 32 Similarly, if in the course of the operation the doctor
discovered a condition which was not anticipated when the patient's
consent to the operation was obtained, "and which, if not removed,
would endanger the life or health of the patient,"3 3 the doctor would
be justified in extending the scope of the operation to remove or
overcome this condition. Although it might appear at first glance
that the latter situation had arisen here, the court pointed out that
the condition of the left ear was not discovered in the course of the
authorized operation, but was disclosed as a result of an unconsentedto examination of the left ear under anaesthetic. Also, there apparently was no serious danger to the patient inherent in the delay
necessary to obtain consent.
Parmelia Davis suffered from epilepsy While she was a patient
in Dr. Pratt's sanitarium, the doctor performed two operations upon
her body, and in the course of the second of these removed her
30. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 267, 104 N.W 12. 14, 1 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 439, 443 (1905)
31. Id. at 268, 104 N.W at 14, 1 L.R.A. (n.s.) at 443.
32. Id. at 269, 104 N.W at 15, 1 L.R.A. (n.s.) at 444.
33. Ibid.
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ovaries and uterus. While Mrs. Davis apparently understood that
the operations would involve her womb and agreed to this, she did
not know the full extent of the proposed operations. In an action
brought for the performance of the operation without her consent,
the doctor relied on the alleged consent of Mr. Davis, but the court
found that consent to the removal of the uterus was lacking.3' The
statement of the law paralleled that in Mohr v. Williams in that the
court emphasized the right of the patient not to be touched except
by consent and recognized that there might be exceptional circumstances in which consent was impracticable. Rather than speaking
in terms of implied consent under these circumstances, the court
said:
... it is the duty of the surgeon, in dealing with these conditions
[the two exceptional situations mentioned above], to act on his
own discretion, making the highest use of his skill and ability
to meet the exigencies which confront him.
S.. In such event the surgeon may lawfully, and it is his duty to,
perform such operation as good surgery demands, without such
consent.i"
Here, as in the Mohr case, there appears to have been no evidence
of these exceptional conditions. Indeed, there is some question as to
whether the operation was even beneficial to the patient, since it did
not appear to improve either her mental or physical health, and it
deprived her of any further hope of having children. 0 An argument
was made that there was consent, on the part of the husband, to
the removal of the ovaries and that "correct surgical practice" required the removal of the uterus at the same time so that consent to
such removal should be implied. The court did not accept this argument, however, in view of the evidence that there was no consent
by the patient to the removal of her ovaries and that the husband
had not consented to their removal in the second operation.
Mattie Inez Strain had stepped on a nail which penetrated the
great toe of her right foot and resulted in serious inflammation of
the toe. She went to Dr. Rolater, who advised her that it would be
necessary to make an incision in the toe in order to drain the infected joint and remove any foreign matter therein. Miss Strain
agreed to the operation but extracted a promise from the doctor
that he would remove no bones from the foot. After the patient was
34. Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562, 7 L.RLA. (ns.) 609 (1906).
35. Id. at 309, 79 N.E. at 565, 7 L.R.A. (ns.) at 612.
36. It should be noted that Parmelia Davis was about forty years old
and had already had four children. If the condition of her ovaries was as indicated in the defendant's testimony it is very unlikely that she would have
been able to bear more children even had the operation not been performed.
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under anaesthetic, the doctor discovered that the joint was covered
by the sesamoid bone and that it would be impossible to drain the
joint without removing the bone. The bone was in an unusual
position, which could not have been ascertained by external examination prior to the operation itself. Although Dr. Rolater testified
that serious consequences would have followed the operation without the removal of the bone, and although there was no evidence
that the bone served any function in the foot, the patient was permitted to recover without proof of any lack of skill on the part of
the doctor. The appellate court affirmed the judgment relying on the
Mohr and Pratt decisions. 37 The result in this case may appear to
be more justifiable than in the prior two inasmuch as there was evidence of a specific prohibition of the act done, z.c., removal of the
bone. It may be argued, however, that in making this condition, the
patient had in mind the cutting or removal of bones which served
some useful function and the removal of which would at least cause
inconvenience to her. The doctor argued that since there was no
evidence that the sesamoid bone served any function and no evidence
of any actual injury resulting from the operation, the plaintiff should
not recover more than nominal damages. The appellate court rejected this argument and said that damages of $1,000.00 were not
excessive on the ground that
Being composed of men of ordinary intelligence, [the jury] may
have consulted their common experience, and reached the conclusion that every bone in the human body serves some useful
purpose, and that the sesamoid bone in the plaintiff's foot served
a purpose, and its removal might have resulted in injury, the
testimony of the experts to the contrary notwithstanding. There
was testimony that the foot was more or less deformed since the
operation, that the joint was stiff, and that the patient could not
wear a shoe for a long time thereafter, and that she had suffered
almost constant pain in the injured foot since the operation.
From the evidence, the jury might have found that the removal
of this sesamoid bone was in a measure responsible for these
unfavorable conditions (since the operation) 88
In the last of these four cases,39 Mary Schloendorff had gone
to the defendant hospital for the purpose of being examined under
ether anaesthesia to ascertain the nature of an unidentified lump
in her stomach. She claimed that at the time of consenting to this
37
(1913).
38.
39.
N.E. 92

Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96, 50 L.R.A. (n.s.) 880
Id. at 580, 137 Pac. at 99, 50 L.R.A. (n.s.) at 884.
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105
(1914)

1957]

UNAUTHORIZED MEDICAL TREATMENT

examination she had notified the doctor, "that there must be no
operation." In the hospital, she was prepared as for an operation,
and while she was under ether a fibroid tumor was removed from
her abdomen. In an action brought against the hospital, the plaintiff's witnesses testified that as a result of this operation "gangrene
developed in her left arm, some of her fingers had to be amputated,
and her sufferings were intense." The issue facing the court was
the extent to which a charitable hospital was to be held responsible
for the acts of doctors and nurses. A verdict was directed for the
defendant hospital. Judge Cardozo, writing for the Court of Appeals
of New York, stated that a charitable hospital might be held not to
be liable to a patient for the negligence of doctors and nurses on
either of two theories- first, on the basis of an implied waiver by the
patient entering a charitable institution (even though he or she paid
for the care received), or second, on the basis that there was no
master-servant relationship between the hospital and the doctors
and nurses. The first of these reasons was deemed inapplicable to
this situation because, as Cardozo said
In the case at hand, the wrong complained of is not merely
negligence. It is trespass. Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient's consent, commits an assault for which he is liable in
damages. Pratt v Davis, .

; Mohr v. Williams, .

This is

true except in cases of emergency where the patient is unconscious and where it is necessary to operate before consent can
be obtained. The fact that the wrong complained of here is trespass rather than negligence, distinguishes this case from most of
the cases which have preceded it. In such circumstances the hospital's exemption from liability can hardly rest upon implied
waiver. Relatively to this transaction, the plaintiff was a stranger.
She had never consented to become a patient for any purpose
other than an examination under ether. She had never waived
the right'to recover damages for any wrong resulting from this
operation, for she had forbidden the operation. 40
The court did find, however, that the hospital might be excused
from liability on the basis that no master-servant relationship
existed between it and the doctors and nurses and because it was not
cognizant of the fact that the operation being performed with its
facilities was in disregard of the express orders of the patient. It
should be noted that the distinction between trespass and negligence was merely a reason given for disregarding one basis for
denying liability although liability was ultimately denied. Further40. Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93-94.
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more, the court might have found lack of an implied waiver on the
basis of express prohibition, whether the operation constituted negligence or assault. Therefore the statement quoted might be doubtful
precedent for other decisions. Yet subsequent courts have quoted
this statement readily And on the facts of the case, the conclusion
as to the nature of liability on the part of the doctors seems warranted. Serious damages resulted from the operation. It was performed in violation of an express prohibition, if the plaintiff's
statements are to be credited. There was no "emergency" and all
that the patient had consented to and sought to have done might
have been accomplished successfully without performing the operation itself, from all that we have in the reports of the case. Of the
four decisions, this seems the strongest for imposing liability without regard to the amount of care or skill exercised by the doctor
and without regard to whether the operation could be classified as
''good surgical practice."
If we accept the language of these four opinions as applied to the
facts in each, the law of civil liability of doctors for unauthorized
operations appears as follows Every individual has a right to the
inviolability of his person which forbids a surgeon or physician to
invade the bodily integrity of his person. Whenever a surgeon or
physician, without the patient's permission, performs an operation
or renders medical treatment, he prima facie commits a battery
Exceptions will be recognized in unusual circumstances where it is
impracticable to obtain the consent of the patient and where there
is a serious threat to the life or health of the patient which must
be dealt with immediately, either by rendering wholly unauthorized
medical treatment or by extending the scope of an authorized operation to remove or overcome an unforeseen condition. The fact that
the medical treatment to which there is no consent is not seriously
harmful, or is in fact beneficial to the patient, does not excuse the
doctor. Further, the fact that the treatment is conducted in accordance with the dictates of good surgery or medicine and is done i a
skillful and careful manner does not constitute an excuse. As to all
of these points the four cases are uniform.
On the other hand, the facts of the cases might lead one to draw
distinctions as to the nature of the liability of the doctor A case involving an express prohibition on the operation, as in the Schlocndorff case, might be distinguished from one in which there was consent to an operation but the nature of the actual operation was not
consented to, as in the Pratt case. A distinction might be drawn
between an express prohibition to any operation and a limitation
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imposed on the extent of the operation, as in the Rolater case.
Finally, a distinction might be drawn between cases in which there
is a showing of affirmative harm to the patient resulting from unauthorized treatment and a case such as Mohr, in which the operation in fact was beneficial and the only deviation from the consent
was with regard to the right or left side of the body. A determination
as to whether such factual distinctions should make a difference in
the nature of the doctor's liability or should result in classifying
one fact situation as an assault and battery and another as negligent
malpractice will be delayed until after an analysis of other cases
involving unauthorized, or unconsented-to treatment.
THE CASE LAW AND THE DOCTOR'S CONDUCT

In classifying the cases of unauthorized operations or similar
medical treatment, a division may be made between those in which
there has been some express prohibition or limitation on the part
of the patient, those in which the doctor acts outside the scope
of affirmative consent, and those in which the doctor has made a
mistake. Before turning to this tri-partite division of cases, however, we should note some cases which appear to be related to our
central problem but deserve separate treatment. These too fall into
three categories:
The first of these categories include cases in which the doctor's
conduct appears to go somewhat beyond the limits of "treatment."
Illustrative of this category is a case such as Bryan v. Grace" in
which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant dentist, having made
an appointment to treat the plaintiff's teeth at a time when no one
else would be in the office, diverted from his usual course of treatment by preparing a pallet on the floor and engaging in gestures
which led the plaintiff to fear that he intended intercourse with her.
While the Georgia court held that there were no facts alleged to
support a claim of assault and battery or any other legal wrong
(apparently on the theory that something more than a mere invitation was necessary), the case is representative of the situation in
which the doctor has taken advantage of his confidential relationship with the patient in order to gratify his own personal lust. A
related case is that of Keen v. Coleman. 2 There the doctor apparently became angered by the patient's refusal to continue a
course of medication which he had prescribed. Under pretense of
examining an incision resulting from his recent operation upon
41. 63 Ga. App. 373, 11 S.E2d 241 (1940).
42. 67 Ga. App. 331, 20 S.E.2d 175 (1942).
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the patient, the doctor induced her to get onto an operating table
and consent to a proposed treatment of the incision through her
vagina and uterus. When she became aware that he was preparing
to operate the patient protested, telling him she was pregnant "and
for God's sake not to do anything to her that would cause her to
lose her child." The doctor then inserted a surgical instrument into
her womb and gave it "a sudden and violent whirling motion"
which resulted in intense pain on the part of the patient and dismembered her unborn child. The doctor then abandoned the patient
without rendering further medical attention and the patient made
her way home unassisted. The court with remarkable restraint said
that since the petition did not show that the doctor was acting in
an emergency arising in connection with his claimed treatment of
an infected incision, a cause of action for unauthorized operation
was set forth by the allegation of the foregoing facts. In Wellman
v. Drake43 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant dentist had exposed a nerve in her tooth and then refused to fill or treat it, but
instead with great force and violence jerked the towel from around
her neck, seized her and pulled her from the chair, shook her
violently and ordered her from the office. Defendant moved to
compel the plaintiff to elect to stand on a claim of malpractice or of
assault and battery, and when she elected assault he moved to
dismiss on the ground that she had not alleged an assault. The motion was overruled, but the appellate court reversed on the ground
that the complaint was framed in terms of malpractice rather than
assault and battery, and that there was no allegation of damage or
injury independent of the failure to treat the tooth. This decision
may have been influenced by the indications in the record that the
dentist was merely trying to calm an hysterical patient, but the
doctor's conduct again appears to have gone somewhat beyond the
normal meaning of "unauthorized operation or treatment."
The second category of cases lying on the periphery of the central problem includes those cases in which treatment is given by a
person who is not licensed to practice medicine. Where the defendant's act is malicious or in total disregard of the patient's welfare and he has consciously misrepresented his status to the patient,
the courts have uniformly classified the situation as one of battery
on the ground that the consent was obtained by fraud as to the very
nature of the act done.4 4 On the other hand, where the treatment is
43. 130 W Va. 229, 43 S.E.2d 57 (1947).
44. See, e.g., People ex rel. Burke v. Steinberg, 190 Misc. 413, 73
N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. City Mag. Ct. 1947) (defendant, in effort to impress her
boy friend, pretended to vaccinate people and injected water) , Commonwealth
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395

itself proper and there is no evidence of malice on the part of the
4
defendant, the courts generally do not speak in terms of battery, 5
although a few have treated lack of a license as evidence of negli46

gence.

A third category involves problems of illegal operations such as
non-therapeutic abortions and sterilizations. Here imposition of
liability upon the doctor in spite of the consent of the patient
appears to be based more on the public policy against the operation
itself than any considerations as to the intent of the doctor or the
protection of the patient's rights.47
Operation after Express Prohibition
Two of the leading cases which are classified under this heading
have already been discussed. A distinction was noted between a prohibition against any sort of operation, such as in Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital,4 s and consent to an operation wlUch
is then conditioned by a prohibition on a specific aspect of the
operation, as in Rolater v'. Stran. 49 Does tus distinction appear
in other cases?
Mrs. Brooks went to Dr. Francis, a dentist, for the extraction of
nine of her teeth. Dr. Francis recommended the further extraction
of an impacted unerupted bicuspid, but Mrs. Brooks objected on the
v. Gregory, 132 Pa. Super. 507, 1 A.2d 501 (1938) (defendant was permitted
to examme plaintiff's semi-nude body and the stump of her leg under misapprehension that he was a medical doctor), Bartell v. State, 106 Wis. 342,
82 N.W. 142 (1900) (defendant under pretense of giving massage treatment
to young girl afflicted with nervous ailment was permitted to examine and
touch her naked body). Cf. Hobbs v. Kizer, 236 Fed. 681 (8th Cir. 1916)
(defendant induced plaintiff to have illicit intercourse with him and, when
she claimed to be pregnant as a result, he made an examination and assured
her that it was merely an abcess which she then consented to have him
remove; defendant performed an abortion).
45. See, e.g., Rubin v. Douglas, 59 A.2d 690 (D.C. Mun. App. 1948);
Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261 Mass. 40, 158 N.E. 270 (1927); Lexchin v.
Mathews, 269 Mich. 120, 256 N.W 825 (1934); Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y.
176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926); Grier v. Phillips, 230 N.C. 672, 55 S.E.2d
485 (1950) ; Martin v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 184 Tenn. 166,
197 S.W2d 798 (1946), Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P.2d 79
(1950).
46. While the large majority of the cases dealing with operations or
treatment by unlicensed physicians say, as in Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176.
151 N.E. 197 (1926), that the mere lack of license does not create any inference of negligence, a few courts have treated the unlicensed practice of
medicine as evidence of negligence. See Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261 Mass.
40, 158 N.E. 270 (1927) ; Brown v. Guy, ... Cal. App. 2d .. , 301 P.2d 413
(1956).
47. See Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability ti the Practice of
Surgery, 14 Rocky Mt L. Rev. 233, 267-80 (1942), for an extensive discussion of this problem.
48. See pp. 390-92 supra for a discussion of the facts of this case.
49. See pp. 389-90 supra for a discussion of the facts of this case.
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ground that her own dentist had said that this involved a more
serious operation than mere extraction. Although there was some
conflict in the testimony as to whether the patient in fact consented, the dentist proceeded to remove the bicuspid by cutting
away the jaw bone around the tooth to the point where there was
so little bone left that the jaw was easily broken. Mrs. Brooks sued,
originally alleging only "malpractice," but amending to include
a claim for removal of the tooth without her consent. The dentist
claimed that the amendment to the complaint was barred by the
intervention of more than one year between the operation and the
date of amendment, since the statute of limitations on an assault
and battery was one year. A verdict for the plaintiff, Mrs. Brooks,
was affirmed on the ground that the amendment "was not a separate
cause of action, but a mere incident of the malpractice case, and
the case still remained as it was in the beginning, an action to recover damages for malpractice." 0 The operation was performed in
connection with similar operations which were consented to, but
the case appears to come closer to the Schloendorff case than to the
Rolater case inasmuch as the extraction of each tooth may be
treated as a separate operation requiring separate consent. Although this might lead to the conclusion that the argument for
"assault and battery" is strengthened, the categorization of the
claim as one for general malpractice may be somewhat justified on
the ground that the act which was most harmful, i.e., breaking the
patient's jaw, appears more like lack of care than an "intentional"
infliction of injury
In two Colorado cases there have been protests against treatment, both involving patients who were injured and rejected the
medical attention of particular doctors. In Meek v. City of Loveland"' the plaintiff was forcibly taken to a county hospital by certain
peace officers and while there his leg was amputated as a result of
a gunshot wound. In an action against the city, the officers and the
doctor who performed the operation, the court talks in terms of
false imprisonment and negligence, but appears to hold the doctor
only for negligence. In Cady v. Fraser" the plaintiff suffered a
fractured ankle and asked for treatment by an orthopedic surgeon.
50. Francis v. Brooks, 24 Ohio App. 136, 144, 156 N.E. 609, 612 (1926).
The further statements in the case, to the effect that the doctor-patient relation continued for some time after the operation, seem to be unnecessary in
deciding the statute of limitations problem where there was no concealment of
the
original wrongful act and where there was no particular claim of a
"continuing" trespass.
51. 85 Colo. 346, 276 Pac. 30 (1929)
52. 122 Colo. 252, 222 P.2d 422 (1950).
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The doctor employed by plaintiff's employer's compensation carrier
said that the specialist was not needed and that the insurance company would not stand the expense. Plaintiff then ordered the doctor
off the case, but the defendant continued to treat him. Although
there was some evidence of acquiescence in this later treatment, the
court's major argument for dismissing a charge of assault and
battery seems to have been that there was also an allegation of
negligent treatment and the two claims where wholly inconsistent,
the assault and battery depending on lack of contract or authority
and the negligence on the presence of authority This would lead to
the conclusion that in a case in which there was a clear proof of
lack of authority the Colorado court would now threat the situation
as one for assault and battery 53 In both of these cases the patients
needed medical care but the particular care was foisted upon them
against their wills, or apparently was. In each there was pain
and suffering, although it may be argued with some merit that
the doctor in fact reduced the harm to the plaintiff in each case by
preventing more serious physical consequences. This might explain
the failure of both decisions to clearly designate the fact situation
as a battery. Some support for this comes from a similar case,
Ollet v. Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry., 54 where the plaintiff had
been injured seriously and was taken in spite of his protests to a
hospital and placed under the care of a doctor other than his own.
There the court said, "The circumstances certainly seemed to call
for great haste, and one who endeavors to assist his neighbor who
is in great danger and distress is certainly not liable for a mistake
in judgment." Although this latter case may fall within the "emergency" exceptions to the general doctrine of unauthorized operations, the general tone of the opinion is that one who in fact
assists the plaintiff is not going to be dealt with severely.
Short of original prohibition of treatment is the situation in
which the patient withdraws consent. For example, in Bakezuell v.
Kahle5 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a chiropractor, had
made an erroneous diagnosis of a tumor or lesion of the brain as a
misplaced vertebra and that, after the plaintiff had protested the
method of treatment and had asked him to stop, the defendant had
given her a more severe and harder thump. Plaintiff recovered a
53. The only other Colorado case on the subject, at least after the Cady
decision, is Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954), in which
the court found that there was no question that a contract had been entered
into and therefore the defendant's act was classified as "negligent" See a
discussion of this case at p. 412 ifra.
54. 201 Pa. 361, 50 Atl. 1010 (1902).
55. 125 Mont 89,232 P2d 127 (1951).
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verdict on a claim for malpractice. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment on the ground that although an unauthorized operation
or treatment constituted an "assault" it also was "malpractice"
even though there was no negligence charged. The situation appears
similar to that in Rolater v. Strat, i.e., consent to general treatment
followed by objection to a particular form of treatment which the
practitioner believes to be necessary The same degree of necessity
present in the Rolater case may not be present here, however, and
the consequences (inability to walk, impaired vision and partial
paralysis) seem considerably more severe than those in the Rolater
6
case. In Corn v. Frenchthe plaintiff had consented to an examination of her breast to determine whether there was cancer, at the
same time stating to the doctor that he was not to remove her breast.
On entering the hospital she signed a written consent "to perform
an operation for mastectomy [removal of the breast]
and to do
whatever may be deemed necessary in his judgment" without actually understanding the meaning of "mastectomy" Following
this she repeated her instructions that her breast was not to be removed, according to her testimony The breast was removed, although later it appeared that there had been no cancer and although
the doctor had not undertaken a biopsy (a microscopic examination
of the tissue taken from a living body) The court reversed an involuntary dismissal of the complaint, saying that the question of
whether the operation was consented to should have gone to the
jury Although the court did not characterize this particular claim
as an assault and battery, it did deal separately with the question of
negligence in relation to the failure to properly diagnose the condition.
The plaintiff in Donald v Swann 7 claimed a trespass to her
person based on the defendant doctor's extraction of fluid from her
spinal column in the course of a physical examination, a procedure
to which she testified she had objected. The trial court refused to
charge, as requested by the defendant, that if the patient had prsented herself to the doctor for diagnosis, treatment and care. the
doctor was authorized to use the ordinary and usual methods of
diagnosis and treatment. On appeal this ruling was affirmed. The
court distinguished between actions based on negligence and actions
for assault and battery based on unauthorized operations, and cited
not only Rolater and Schloendorff but also Francis v Brooks 8 and
56. 289 P.2d 173 (Nev. 1955)
57 24 Ala. App. 463, 137 So. 178 (1931)
58. 24 Ohio App. 136. 156 N.E. 609 (1926), discussed supra pp. 394-95.
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Hershey v. Peake," both of which appear to treat the unauthorized
operation as something other than a standard assault and battery
for purposes of avoiding the bar of a short statute of limitations. The
report does not indicate the nature of the damage suffered by the
patient, although some pain and suffering probably accompanied
the spinal tap. Also there appears to have been no contradiction
that the spinal tap was a necessary part of a complete diagnosis of
the plaintiff's condition. This seems to make the case more like
Rolater than Schloendorff or Francts.
Somewhat similar are the cases in which an anaethetic has
been given contrary to the patient's orders. In Woodson v.Huey 0
where the patient had told her doctor that she did not wish to have a
spinal anaesthetic but one was in fact administered with severe ill
effects, recovery was allowed for battery against the anaesthetist
who administered the anaesthetic. 6 ' In Keister v. O'NeIP 2 the trial
court directed a verdict for the doctor who had administered a spinal
anaesthetic after an express prohibition.63 The appellate court conceded that there was undoubtedly a technical battery if the administration of the anaesthetic was contrary to the patient's orders, but
refused to grant a new trial since there was no showing of actual
damages resulting from such "battery." In Zink vt. Basham 4 the
use of a spinal anaesthetic in the course of an examination of the
plaintiff resulted in paralysis of her body below the waist. Although
it appears that the patient had protested, the court talks almost
exclusively in terms of negligence, which might be explained by the
fact that the complaint was framed in terms of negligence, whereas
in the Dondd, Woodson and Keister cases there was an express
claim for battery. In Bishop v. ShurlyV the plaintiff, mother of the
minor patient, had expressed a desire that local anaesthetic not be
used and claimed that the doctor had agreed to use a general anaesthetic. The patient apparently had requested a local anaesthetic immediately before the operation and the court treated this as sufficient
in view of his maturity. While the court indicates that the administration of a local anaesthetic after agreeing to use a general would
59. 115 Kan. 562, 223 Pac. 1113 (1924), discussed mira p. 418.
60. ... Okla. ... , 261 P.2d 199 (1954).
61. The doctor who was to perform the operation wvas absolved from
liability because he had noted the limitation on anaesthetic on the patient's
chart, had spoken to the anaesthetist and was not present when the spinal
anaesthetic was admnimstered.
62. 59 Cal. App. 2d 428,138 P.2d 723 (1943).
63. The actual prohibition in this case came not from the patient, but
from her husband and mother-m-law, due both to the patient's minority and
to her temporary incapacity to consent.
64. 164 Kan. 456, 190 P.2d 203 (1948).
65. 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W 75 (1926).
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give rise to a cause of action, it also speaks in terms of a "breach of
an obligation" and "proximate cause," which terminology is normally associated with negligence claims rather than claims for trespass
to the person.
Other situations involve prohibitions as to the extent of the
operation. One of the early cases presenting a problem of unauthorized operation was Beatty v. Cullingworth, not officially reported
but mentioned in several other sources. 6 The surgeon was performing an ovariotomy Prior to the operation the female patient
told him that if he found both ovaries diseased he must remove
neither as she was going to be married shortly The surgeon testified
that he then said, "You must leave that to me" and "you may be
sure that I will not remove anything I can help," but the patient
denied having heard these statements. In the course of the operation
both ovaries were found to be diseased and the surgeon concluded
that the patient's life and health would be imperilled by failure to
remove both. The trial judge charged the jury
If a medical man, with a desire to do his best for the patient,
undertakes an operation, I should think it is a humane thing for
him to do everything in his power to remove the nischief, provided he has no definite instructions not to operate. There was
here no question as to the propriety of the operation, and the
defendant always told the plaintiff she must give him a free hand.
If you think tacit consent was given, you must find for the
defendant.
The jury found for the defendant doctor. This decision may be made
on the basis of a finding of consent, at least implied from the patient's continuing to submit to the operation after the statements of
the doctor. It is perhaps noteworthy that in referring to this case,
Halsbury's Laws of England contains the comment
In the majority of cases there is doubtless an implied consent
to do what the surgeon, without negligence, considers necessary
and desirable. This consent would be negatived by express instructions not to do certain things, but if a surgeon found that
it was necessary to do these things and did them against instruccircumstances,
tions, it is difficult to see, apart from some special
7
what damage the patient would have suffered.0
Perry v. Hodgson6" involved an operation on the plaintiff's leg
which had been crippled by a childhood disease. In giving his con66. See 44 Cent. L.J. 1953 (1896) and the statement of the case in
Marshall v. Curry, (1933) 3 D.L.R. 260, 265, 60 Can. Crim. Cas. 136, 141

(Nov. Scot. Sup. Ct. 1933).
67
68.

22 Halsbury, Laws of England 319 n. (f) (Hailsham ed. 1936)
168 Ga. 678, 148 S.E. 659 (1929).
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sent, the patient's father (the patient being a minor) specifically
said that he did not want the surgeon to go near the hip joint nor to
affect a "track" through which infection in that joint was drained.
The surgeon did cut into the hip joint, which, it was alleged,
caused further pain and permanent crippling of the plaintiff. Plaintiff brought an action alleging violation of the agreement, breach of
a duty owed to him and trespass to his person. Defendant denied
that there was an agreement and pleaded that lie had used proper
skill and care in the operation. Further, the defendant introduced
expert testimony to the effect that the operation was a proper one.
The defendant obtained a verdict. The Supreme Court of Georgia
reversed, saying that the case was a suit for damages arising out of
a trespass and that the issues in the case should have been confined
to trespass and that.
Where a surgeon enters into an agreement with a person merely
to perform a certain operation, and the surgeon in violation
of that contract goes further without an emergency, and performs another operation which is unauthorized by the agreement,
or by an emergency necessitating the additional operation, and
injury results, he cannot relieve himself from liability by pleading and showing skill and care in the additional operation.'
Again, unlike the Rolater case, there was no pressing necessity
shown and the damages resulting from the operation were substantial.
In Dicenzo v. Berg70 the patient suffered from a bone chip imbedded in his shoulder or lower neck. The doctor told him that "We
are going to operate on you on top of shoulder [sic]." The patient
said, "Don't go too much up in the neck." When the operation was
completed the patient sued claiming that it had involved his neck
and was therefore performed without authority. The trial court
directed a verdict for the defendant on the issue of negligence,
which was also pleaded. The jury disagreed on the issue of whether
there had been consent. On appeal from the denial of the doctor's
motion for judgment, the Pennsylvania court said that even laying
aside a written general consent executed by the patient upon entering the hospital and the evidence of the defendant's witnesses to the
effect that the patient had orally consented as well, there was not
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that the patient had not consented "to such operation as was considered necessary by the surgeon to alleviate the conditions with which plaintiff was suffering.
69. Id. at 687, 148 S.E. at 662-63.

70. 340 Pa. 305, 16 A2d 15 (1940).
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Plaintiff's evidence shows he knew the neck would be involved
in the operation." 71 While the case turned more on the nature of
the consent of the plaintiff than on the nature of the defendant's
acts, it illustrates the distinction suggested previously between the
situation in which there is no consent at all and that in which there
is consent to the general treatment and accomplishment of a certain
objective but the patient attempts to impose conditions on the
manner in which the operation is to be performed. More than this,
it suggests that if the patient is cognizant of the likelihood of a
particular part of his body being involved in the operation and does
not make his prohibition on such an extension of the operation clear,
he may be taken to have consented.
In a recent case"2 the doctors, making an examination of the
patient's throat in connection with the possibility of a cancer there,
cut a piece off of an edematous polyp, although the patient alleged
that she had said specifically that she wanted only a laryngoscopic
examination and that there definitely was to be no cutting. The defendant doctors testified that prior to the operation they explained to
the patient that the diagnosis could not be complete without obtaining a specimen for a biopsy, and claimed that the patient had consented. Judgment for the doctors was reversed on the ground that
it was improper for the trial court to exclude the testimony of the
patient's family physician to the effect that he had called defendants'
office and had told the receptionist specifically that there was to be
only a visual examination and "no biopsy or cutting was to be
done." The conclusion to be drawn from this ruling is that if
such instructions were in fact given, there would be a cause of
action even though the examination undertaken would have been
incomplete without the clipping. There is no statement in the
facts recited by the court that the plaintiff in fact suffered any
permanent or severe harm as a result of the actions of the doctors.
In the cases involving an express protest or prohibition there
appear to be two factual situations which may be distinguished one
where the treatment is wholly unauthorized as in Schloendorff,
Franczs, Meek, Ollet, Corn and possibly Cady, the other where
there has been consent to a general type of treatment or submission
to the care of a doctor for a specified objective but with some limitations imposed on the method of treatment which the doctor has disregarded in the exercise of his own judgment, as in Rolater, Beatty,
Perry and possibly Dzcenzo. The cases of limitations on the use
71. Id. at 309-10, 16 A.2d at 17
72. Marshall v. Harter, 262 S.W 2d 180 (Ky. 1953)
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of certain diagnostic methods, Donald v. Swann and Marshall v.
Harter,or of prohibition of the use of local anaesthetics, iWoodson,
Keister,Zink and Bishop, might be classified in the former category
on the ground that these methods and particularly the use of a
specific type of anaesthetic are separable from the consented-to
operation or treatment.
Where the patient has made it clear that he wants no treatment
or operation on a given portion of his body the argument is strong
that the doctor's performance of an operation is an intentional invasion of the plaintiff's bodily integrity When there is added the
existence of actual harm resulting from such invasion, as in Schloendorff, Corn, Francis, Woodson, and Zink, the classification of the
defendant's conduct as a "battery" would be justified by tradition."
Yet it should be noted that in Francisv. Brooks the court refused to
apply the "assault and battery" statute of limitations and grouped
the conduct with the general category of negligent malpractice;
and in Zink v. Bashaam the court treated the conduct as "negligence." Where the intentional invasion is not accompanied by
any clear showing of harm resulting directly from the invasion
itself, as in Meek, Cady or Ollet (assuming that in these cases the
doctors in fact conferred benefit on the patients) and in Donald,
Keister and Marshall v. Harter, the courts which would classify
the conduct as "battery" would be vindicating only the plaintiff's
right to make the decision as to medical care himself. It is significant,
therefore, that only in the Donald and Keister cases did the courts
use this classification.
Where the patient has given general consent to the treatment
but has imposed specific limitations, the same subdivision may be
made between infliction of actual harm and an invasion which does
not clearly cause harm. In the cases in which there was apparently
some harm, Bakewell and Perry, the court spoke in terms of "battery." In Beatty, Rolater and Dicenzo whether there was any actual
loss to the plaintiff may be questioned. No recovery was had in two
of these cases. In Rolater the court again seems to have been
vindicating the right of the patient to make her own decisions rather
than actually compensating for harm which was directly traceable
to wrongful conduct on the part of the doctor. The merits of such
classification are weaker here than in the situations in which there
has been total lack of consent. In each of these cases the patient
73. Restatement, Torts § 13 (1934). It is also true that physical harm
is not a izne qua nw-ofor a finding of "battery." Prosser, Torts 31-32 (2d ed.
1955) ; Restatement, Torts § 18 (1934).
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entrusted his or her body to the doctor for the purpose of receiving
medical assistance for some physical ailment. It may well be argued
that the patient's limitation on the nature of the treatment arose
from misapprehensions as to the dangers involved in a particular
type of operation, such as the removal of the sesamoid bone, or as
to the risks inherent in not doing as the doctor in fact did, i.e., the
possibility and danger of poison or disease spreading from the diseased tissue throughout the body If a doctor is to perform his professional services most effectively, he must have some discretion
as to the manner of treatment. Dr. Hubert Winston Smith, one of
the leading authorities on legal medicine in this country, has said
It follows from a patient's right to withhold consent and prohibit
life saving surgery, that he can impose terms and conditions on
his consent.
A surgeon should not bind himself to conditions
which are incompatible with good surgery, for by doing so he
contracts away the professional judgment which may be necessary to proper performance of his main task. 4
The same sort of argument could also be made as to the necessity
for removal of spinal fluid or body substances in order to make a
complete diagnosis of the patient's disease or illness.
The courts have uniformly recognized that there is one sittation in which broad discretion is proper, i.e., where there is an
emergency involving life or serious injury to the patient and the
consent of the patient is impracticable to obtain." Perhaps this
same sort of discretion could be extended to cover the situation
where a reasonable and prudent physician or surgeon would have
considered that the condition should be corrected and would have
approved the treatment or operation. The major argument against
such an extension of the existing discretion of the doctor appears to
lie in the interest of the patient in making his own decision. Yet
in most of the cases involved here the patient at the time of laying
down the prohibition did not know all of the facts, and in most of
them there was no way that he or she could know all of the facts
at that time. May it not be more in the interests of patients in such
a situation to give the doctor rather broad discretion Dr Smith
has suggested the difficulty in requiring that the patient make the
ultimate decision without the guidance of expert knowledge which
the doctor has, and frequently without having all of the information
which the doctor later obtains. He has concluded
74. Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practiceof Susrgery.
14 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 233, 238-39 (1942)
75. See p. 388 supra.
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. unless the prohibition is sweeping and precise, courts should
always hold that loose restrictions are to be confined by reading
them in the light of facts known pre-operatively. It is fair to
assume that if the unconscious patient knew of the discovery of
a materially different condition, so grave as to constitute a
threat to life or health unless relieved by immediate surgery, he
would renounce his prohibition and instruct the surgeon to proceed. In laying down the vague prohibition, a patient expresses
his vague fears of surgery and his secret dread of unnecessary
or experimental measures. The very fact that he was willing to
trust the surgeon to correct what both thought was the specific
cause of his complaint, indicates that the patient is mainly concerned about getting out as lightly as possible.-This would limit the surgeon's discretion, as the courts do, to those
emergencies which arise after consent is impracticable to obtain
and where the operation is necessary to save life or health. Some
argument might be made that the latter term is broad enough to
-gve the doctor sufficient discretion. However, the result in such
cases as Rolater or Marshallv. Harter indicates that the courts are
apt to read "threat to health" rather narrowly.
Operation Beyond Terms of Consent
Where there has been no express prohibition nor protest to
an operation or treatment, the patient may contend that he had only
consented to a specified operation or specified treatment and that
"the doctor has undertaken to render more extensive or different
treatment. In such a situation should the courts classify the doctor's
acts as a battery subject to the traditional incidents mentioned
above ?7 Or should the patient be forced or permitted to rely upon
the more general charge that the doctor has failed to measure up to
the standard of conduct established by the practice of a reasonable
doctor of good standing in the same or similar locality and of the
same school of medicine?
The fact situation which comes closest to that of an express
prohibition appears in Physicians'and Dentists' Business Bureau -v.
Dray.78 The patient had consented to an examination under anaesthetic for the purpose of making certain laboratory tests. While she
was under the anaesthetic the doctor removed her uterus. The facts
resemble those of the Sciioendorff case except that there apparently
was not express prohibition on the part of the patient to the per76. Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability ii the Practiceof Surgery,
14 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 233, 238 (1942).
77 See pp. 383-84 supra.
78. 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111 P.2d 568 (1941).
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formance of an operation.- Since the ostensible object of the
anaesthesia was only to enable the doctors to make an examination
and laboratory tests, such prohibition of a more extensive operation may not have appeared to be necessary Although the court
acknowledged that an unauthorized operation would be an assault
and battery, it went on to classify the claim of the patient in this
case as one for "injury to the person" in common with negligence,
to avoid the shorter period of limitations applicable to assault actions. In doing this, the court found support from decisions in
some of the states in which the courts had classified an unauthorized
operation as an assault.8 0
Mohr v. Williams8 ' is another leading example of operations
performed without express prohibition which are nonetheless treated
as unauthorized. There the consent had been to an operation on the
right ear but the operation was actually performed upon the left
ear. As indicated above, the court treated this as a battery and permitted recovery in spite of the fact that the operation had been
generally beneficial and skillfully performed.
8 2
In a similar case, Bennan v Parsonnet,
the patient had consented to an operation on the left groin for a rupture. After the
patient was under anaesthetic, the surgeon's assistants pointed out
that a much more serious condition existed in the right groin and
upon closer examination the doctor found a hernia which was in
danger of strangulation. If this had occurred, death appeared to
be the probable result. The doctor operated on the right groin. In an
action brought for assault and battery, the trial court charged that
an operation without consent would be a legal wrong but that if,
after the patient was under anaesthetic, a condition was discovered
which threatened life and health, the consent of the patient to correction of such condition should be inferred. The jury found for the
plaintiff patient. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on appeal,
the appellate court stating that unimpeached medical evidence established that the hernia was a menace to life and health. The court
cited the Mohr decision, but said that the common law view, that

79. There was an allegation in the complaint to the effect that the
operation was performed "against her will" but no mention of a specific
prohibition.
80. Burke v. Maryland, 149 Minn. 481, 184 N.W 32 (1921), Francis
v. Brooks, 24 Ohio App. 136, 156 N.E. 609 (1926), White v. Hirschfield, 108
Okla. 263, 236 Pac. 406 (1925) , Klingbeil v. Saucerman, 165 Wis. 60, 160
N.W 1051, 1 A.L.R. 1311 (1917)
81. 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W 12, 1 L.R.A. (n.s.) 439 (1905), discussed
pp. 387-88 mipra.
82. 83 N.J.L. (54 Vroom) 20, 83 Ati. 948 (1912)
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the patient was entitled to recover whenever there was no consent,
must be modified as a result of the advent of anaesthetics which
changed the circumstances of the operation. The court pointed out
that it was frequently inpossible to make a complete diagnosis before the patient was under anaesthetic and thereafter consent to
all necessary operations would be impossible to obtain from the
patient himself. To remedy this situation the court proceeded to
designate the doctor as the representative of the patient for the purpose of determining whether any operation was necessary and what
operation was necessary. This would not mean that the doctor
could never be held responsible, however, for the implied authority
to make such determinations would not afford the doctor "license
to operate upon a patient against his will or by subterfuge, or to
perform upon him any operation of a sort different from that to
which he had consented, or that involved risks and results of a
kind not contemplated. '" 3 On the facts before it, the court may
have been justified in concluding that, since the patient had submitted to a hernia operation and had contemplated the risks involved
in such an operation, there was no serious departure from the express consent in performing the same operation on the other side of
the body The real significance of the opinion, however, is in its
recognition that strict compliance with a requirement of actual
consent might "paralyze the judgment of the surgeon and require
him to withhold his skill and wisdom at the very juncture when
they are most needed, and when, could the patient have been consulted, he would manifestly have insisted upon their being exercised
in his behalf."''s While tis does not completely reject the "battery"
classification, it suggests that the court may look to what is
reasonable medical practice under the circumstances.
Miss Hively consented to an operation on the septum of her
nose by Dr. Higgs, an eye, ear, nose and throat specialist. In the
course of the operation, Dr. Higgs removed Miss Hively's tonsils,
thereby, according to her amended complaint, "causing plaintiff to
suffer great physical pain and will for all time to come cause plaintiff to suffer great physical pain." The court did not follow the
reasoning of the Beninan case but found liability, saying that there
was no new condition discovered in the course of the operation
which could not have been discovered prior to the operation and that
there was no mere general instruction on the part of the patient that
the doctor should do whatever was necessary in his judgment for
83. Id. at 2S, 83 AtL at950.
84. Id. at 27, 83 AtI. at 951.
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the benefit of the patient." In answer to the argument of the defendant, Dr. Higgs, that damages should be limited to a nominal
one dollar on the ground that there was no showing of harm, inasmuch as the tonsils served no useful function, the court said that
there was a presumption that every organ in the body served some
function and that the presumption was not overcome by the fact that
medical science had not as yet discovered the function of the tonsils.
Also the plaintiff had testified that she had suffered great pain and
that her throat still bothered her In a more recent decision, Reddington v. Clayman, 6 another court found that the removal of a
child's uvula in the course of an operation to remove tonsils and
adenoids would give rise to a cause of action for battery if the
jury did not find that the parents' consent was broad enough to
cover this organ. It did not appear that there was any special damage done to the child, and the doctors testified that the uvula did
present some danger to the child's health in their oplinion.
The case of Valdez v. Percv 7 presents an unusual situation. TI'he
patient suffered from enlarged glands of the right axilla (armpit)
The doctor told the patient that an operation was advisable to remove the gland and send it to a laboratory to determine the nature
of the tumor. The patient consented to such a procedure. The first
report back from the laboratory indicated that there was "carcinoma
of the breast" but this was shortly amended to indicate only the
presence of Hodgkins' disease which affected the axillary glands.
The doctor removed the right breast. The conflicting reports from
the laboratory were apparently the result of some confusion as to the
source of the specimen sent to the laboratory In an action brought
by the patient, the court felt that the doctor did not have sufficient
reason for the removal of the breast and reversed the granting of a
nonsuit by the trial court. It is not clear that the appellate court
was thinking purely in terms of battery rather than negligence,
possibly because the patient had signed a general consent to "any
and all operations which may be deemed advisable." However, it did
rely upon Hively v. Higgs, which speaks of battery, and the decision
has been cited in subsequent California opinions as though it were
a case of assault and battery "IThe court indicated that the question
of consent would be one for the jury, and on retrial the plaintiff
85.
86.
87
88.
(1948),
Ehlen v.

Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 Pac. 363, 53 A.L.R. 1052 (1927)
134 N.E.2d 920 (Mass. 1956).
35 Cal. App. 2d 485, 96 P.2d 142 (1939)
See Preston v. Hubbell, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 59, 196 P.2d 113, 116
Estrada v. Orwitz, 75 Cal. App. 2d 54, 57, 170 P.2d 43, 45 (1946)
Burrows, 51 Cal. App. 2d 141, 145, 124 P.2d 82, 84 (1942)
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recovered only on the negligence claim but not on the claim for
assault and battery.s9

In the foregoing cases, the patient had censented to an operation on a designated portion of the body and the operation to which
objection was made was performed on another distinct portion of
the body. A much more common occurrence is the situation where
there is a semi-exploratory operation in the abdominal region with
consequences which the patient did not anticipate. This is particularly likely to occur in cases involving the female organs. Pratt v.
0
Davis"
is probably the leading case in this area. In another early
case, King v. Carney,91 the patient had been informed by her family
physician that the reason for her frequent miscarriages was laceraton of the uterus. The patient went to the defendant doctor and told
him, "I want to be fixed so I can bear children, and we will never be
happy without that." The defendant confirmed the diagnosis of
laceration of the uterus and told the patient, "I will fix you up, and
you can go back home before long and it will be all right." While
the patient was under anaesthetic, the defendant discovered that
both ovaries and the fallopian tubes were infected and that the
patient could never bear children. He removed the diseased organs.
In an action brought for unauthorized operation and negligence, the
trial court excluded evidence offered by the defendant to establish
that the fallopian tubes and ovaries were so badly diseased that it
was necessary to remove them to safeguard the patient's life and
health. The appellate court reversed judgment for the plaintiff,
holding tis ruling to be error, and stated that the patient had submitted herself to the operation for the purpose of being cured if
possible, and that when the doctor discovered an unanticipated condition which constituted a danger to life and health he was authorized to extend the operation to correct it. In other cases, however,
the doctors have not been so fortunate. For example, the Ohio
Supreme Court in Wells v. Van Nor 92 said that a woman who
had submitted to an operation for appendicitis could recover for
the removal of her fallopian tubes when there had been no mention
made of such a result and the doctor had indicated that the appen89. See Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. 2d 338, 217 P.2d 422 (1950) for the

appeal from this second trial on the issue of negligence. This case was originally tried in the year 1934, reached the District Court of Appeals in 1939 on
the first trial, was retried in 1948 some fifteen years after the original operation, and finally reached the Supreme Court of California im 1950.
90. 224 II. 300, 79 N.E. 562, 7 L.R.A. (n.s.) 609 (1906), discussed
pp. 388-89 supra.
91. 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270, 26 A.L.R 1032 (1922).
92. 100 Ohio St. 101, 125 N.E. 910 (1919).
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dectomy would be a relatively simple operation. The doctor there
testified that he could have treated the tubes, but that there was a
good chance that the atient would be back in the hospital within
two months. Similarly in Tabor v. Scobee98 the court allowed recovery for the removal of fallopian tubes without the consent of the
patient when there appeared to be no immediate emergency Reversing the situation somewhat, the Illinois Court of Appeals in
Church v. Adler94 would permit the patient to recover for removal
of her appendix when she believed that the operation was for the
removal of her ovaries, and the court in In re Johnson's Estate"'
permitted recovery for the removal of an appendix where the
patient had consented to the removal of a tumor which was not in
fact removed. In both of the last two cases the main thrust of the
plaintiff's complaint was the negligence of the doctor in failing to
remove the designated organ or growth, and the courts seemed to
treat the cases more as instances of negligence than as assaults. In
a number of cases, however, the courts have given the doctors wide
discretion in operating where the diseased fallopian tubes constituted
a threat to health and where in the doctors' best judgment an operation was necessary 9o In such cases considerable weight appears to
have been placed on the fact that the patient has submitted to the
doctor's care for the purpose of being cured of her ailment and
that the precise nature of the operation is really incidental to this
main objective, whereas in the Wells, Tabor, Church and Johnson
cases, the doctor had been fairly specific in the original diagnosis.
Where the patient consents to an operation upon a given portion
of his body and the actual operation performed is materially different
in the sense that it involves greater risk to life and health or involves
a longer period of recovery and results in more serious consequences
than the patient anticipated, some question may be raised as to
whether or not there is an authorized operation. Perhaps some of
the prior cases should be classified as involving this situation. In
Pratt v. Dans,9 7 King v. Carney,9 s Russell v. Jackson,"9 and
93. 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1952)
94. 350 Ill. App. 471, 113 N.E.2d 327 (1953).
95. 145 Neb. 333, 16 N.W.2d 504 (1944).
96. Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Cal. App. 2d 776, 208 P.2d 68 (1949) , Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943), Rothe v. Hull, 352
Mo. 926, 180 S.W.2d 7 (1944), Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d
754 (1956), Russell v. Jackson, 37 Wash. 2d 66, 221 P.2d 516 (1950) Cf.
Danielson v. Roche, 109 Cal. App. 2d 832, 241 P.2d 1028 (1952), in which the
question of consent is disputed.
97 See note 90 supra.
98. See note 91 supra.
99. See note 96 supra.
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Wheeler v. Barker,100 the patients appear to have had some idea
that the organs which were in fact removed might be affected by the
operations. The same situation appears to have occurred in Dicenco
v. Berg.'0 ' In all but the Pratt case, the courts found no liability,
and in Russell and Wheeler and Dweno the courts relied on the
fact that the p'tients knew of the general scope of the operations,
although in each it appears that he or she did not know of the actual
consequences.
In an early Michigan case, Zoterell v. Repp,102 the patient
claimed that the doctor had described the proposed operation as a
minor one, designed only to relieve a "retroverted uterus," and that
subsequently he had obtained her consent to a second operation
which he indicated was merely to repair a hernia which had developed as a result of the original operation. In fact the doctor had
removed both of the patient's ovaries. Although the patient alleged
that she had specifically told the doctor that she did not wish her
ovaries removed, the appellate court found that there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's charge to the jury that the
patient had submitted to the operation understanding the possible
consequences. In Paulsenv. Gundersenu'0 the patient suffered from
ear trouble and placed himself in the hands of the defendant who
told him that the proposed operation would be a "simple" mastoid
operation unaccompanied by any danger. The operation proved to
be a "radical" one in the course of which the facial nerve was
severed and the patient's face was paralyzed on one side. The court
stated that there might be recovery for "assault" if there was a
material change in the nature of the operation, but it limited recovery to exclude the expense, pain and natural or necessary results
of the simple operation to which the patient consented. In Bonner v.
Moran,0 4 where a minor agreed to provide skin for a graft onto his
burned cousin, the court allowed recovery on the ground that lie did
not appreciate the danger involved. The plaintiff in vall v. Bri 0°5
agreed to what was supposed to be a minor operation to remove
a cyst but which turned out to be a much more serious operation
resulting in partial paralysis of the patient's face. The court permitted recovery for what it called a "battery" and stated that there
had been no showing of lack of skill or proper care in the original
100.
101.
102.
103.

See note 96 supra.
340 Pa. 305, 16 A.2d 15 (1940), discussed at pp. 401-02 supra.
187 fid. 319, 153 N.W 692 (1915).
218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W 448 (1935).

104. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
105. 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943).
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diagnosis or subsequent operation. Beringer v. Lackner °0 involved
a patient who consented to a curettement of her uterus and womb
but was subjected to a vaginal hysterectomy when the curettemcnt
proved to be impossible to perform. The court there sustained a
claim of assault and battery, citing Pratt v Davis. In Maercklem v.
'
Sinth,17
the plaintiff had originally talked to the doctor about a
circumcision and when he returned to the doctor's office some six
months later, he said he wanted "the operation." A vasectomy was
performed which sterilized the plaintiff. The trial court directed a
verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed
on the ground that there was some question as to whether the
original agreement had been so clear that a violation of its terms
would be "negligence," and directed the trial court to submit this
question to the jury It also dismissed a claim by the defendant
that the action was barred by a one-year statute of limitations
on assault and battery In Adams v. Boyce,' the patient entered
the hospital to have a piece of metal removed from his eye. Ile
claimed that he believed the doctors were going to use only a
large magnet to withdraw the metallic splinter, but in fact it was
necessary to cut open the eye ball. Following the operation the
patient's eye swelled shut and he eventually lost the sight of that
eye. Patient brought an action alleging assault and battery as well as
negligence, and was nonsuited. The nonstuit was affirmed on the
basis that there was no evidence of negligence and that the patient
had submitted to the doctor's care for the removal of the object and
could not be taken to have consented only to the use of the magnet.
In each of the cases there was substantial harm resulting to the
patient, and in most cases in which the court or jury found that
the operation went beyond the scope of consent the conduct of the
defendant was treated as a battery
In other cases involving extension of the operation beyond the
scope of consent there has been substantially less serious harm.
For example, in Nolan v

109
the patient consulted the
Kechijian,

doctor about pains in the region of the stomach and was told that
an operation was needed to strengthen the ligaments of her spleen.
She was told that such an operation was not serious, but in fact
her spleen was removed. There was medical evidence that the spleen
was not diseased but there appears to have been no serious after106.
107
108.
109.

331 Ill. App. 591, 73 N.E.2d 620 (1947)
129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954)
37 Cal. App. 2d 541, 99 P.2d 1044, cert. demed, 311 U.S. 694 (1940).
75 R.I. 165, 64 A.2d 866 (1949)
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effect of its removal. The patient was permitted to maintain an
action for trespass to the body as well as for negligence. In McGuire
v. Riz,130 the patient had fractured her ankle. The doctor tried
manual manipulation and while the patient was under anaesthetic
cut into her foot to set the bones. He had not told her that any
cutting would be necessary, although it appears that this was a
necessary procedure in this case. The patient complained that the
cutting was unauthorized. A dismissal of her action was affirmed
on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence and that
when it became apparent that manual manipulation would not be
sufficient, it was not necessary to revive, the patient to obtain her
consent since "consent may be implied from circumstances and an
operation may be demanded by an emergency without consent."
Some reliance was placed on the fact that the patient had said to
the doctor that he must not cut off her foot, which was some indication that she was not wholly without appreciation of the risk of some
surgery. In two older cases, Slater v. Baker & Stapleton"' and
Boydston v. Giltier,112 the doctors refractured broken limbs allegedly without the consent of the patients. In each of these cases the
courts dealt with the problem as one involving a breach of the standard of care normally exercised by physicians rather than as strict
assault and battery cases. While some pain and suffering undoubtedly resulted, there is no particular reason to assume that the resulting condition was any worse than would have been the condition
of the patient's limb if no such treatment had been undertaken.
A separate problem is raised by cases in which the doctor, in
the course of an authorized operation or treatment, goes beyond
the scope of consent in order to repair a condition found or to
remedy an injury resulting from the operation itself. In Franklyn
v. Peabody,"' the plaintiff consented to an operation designed to
correct a stiff finger. The doctor discovered, on opening the hand,
that the tendons had adhered and concluded that it would be necessary to sheathe each tendon in additional fascia, which he obtained
from the fascia lata of the right thigh. The plaintiff complained that
the operation on the thigh resulted in a muscle hernia and caused
pain and disability. Recovery was permitted, the court citing the
Pratt, Mohr and Rolater decisions and rejecting the defendant's
claim that he had performed according to the dictates of "good
surgery." On the latter point the court said, "An unauthorized
110. 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929).
111. 2 Wils. K.B. 359, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (1767).
112. 3 Ore. 118 (1869).
113. 249 Mich. 363, 228 N.W 681 (1930).
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operation may be well performed and in line with good surgery
and still afford no excuse for such a trespass to the person.""'
While it might have been argued that this was one of the unanticipated conditions as to which physicians and surgeons are given discretion to act, there was no serious threat of death or injury to the
health of the patient, so the court thought.
In Markart v. Zetmer,115 the plaintiff alleged in the first count
of his complaint that he had submitted to a hernia operation in the
course of which the defendant doctors negligently closed off the
blood to his.right testicle and negligently made an incision in said
testicle, and in the second count alleged that the doctors did the
foregoing and also performed a second operation without the
patient's consent in which they removed the testicle. Verdict for the
plaintiff was reversed by the appellate court on the ground that
there was no evidence of negligence in cutting off the blood or nerve
connections in the first operation and that the issue of negligence
should not have been submitted to the jury The jury did recognize
that there might be a valid claim for unauthorized operation if this
issue were submitted separately to the jury It may be argued that
if there was no negligence in the initial operation and if the subsequent operation was necessary to "repair" a condition which
threatened serious harm, there should be no liability on the part of
the doctors so long as they acted reasonably in the performance
of the second operation. This may have been in the back of the
court's mind, since there is a statement that "Plaintiff's case is
founded on the claim that the operation was negligently performed," 6 and in a later decision on the question of the costs of
the appeal, the court refers to the case as one for injuries "directly
produced by defendant's negligence.
"17 Furthermore, in a more
recent decision in the same jurisdiction, Preston v. Hubbell,"8 the
court appears to have adopted this approach. In this later case
the patient had gone to the defendant dentist for the removal of an
impacted wisdom tooth. In the course of the removal, the patient's
jaw was broken and the dentist repaired it while the patient was
under anaesthetic. The patient suffered some ill effects and sued
for negligence in the removal of the tooth and for the repair of the
jaw without her consent. The court reversed judgment on a verdict
for the defendant, on the basis of erroneous instructions on the issue
114. Id. at 368, 228 N.W at 683.
115. 67 Cal. App. 363, 227 Pac. 683 (1924).
116. Id. at 368, 227 Pac. at 684.

117 Markart v. Zelmer, 74 Cal. App. 152, 154, 239 Pac. 856, 857 (1925)
118. 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 196 P.2d 113 (1948).

1957]

UNAUTHORIZED MEDICAL TREATMENT

of contributory negligence, but accepted the argument of the dentist
that the patient must be taken to have consented to the performance
of any emergency work which became necessary in order to completely repair a condition developing during the operation. Although
the court relied on cases involving unauthorized operations as batteries, it did say that the claim of want of consent was merely incidental to the alleged unskillfulness in the performance of the operation to repair the jaw. This at least raises some question as to
whether the California court would treat such a claim, framed exclusively in terms of unauthorized operation, as an action for assault
and battery or an action for negligence.
In another action in which the patient claimed that there had
been no consent to other than a hernia operation and that the
defendant had removed a testicle without his consent, the court
accepted the doctor's defense that the removal was a necessary part
of the. operation, the necessity of which could not reasonably have
been ascertained by diagnosis prior to the beginning of the operation. 19 The court spoke of unanticipated conditions arising during
the course of operation as justifying the doctor exceeding the consent of the patient, but rejected the argument that there was any
"implied consent" or that the physiclan became a "representative" of
the patient for the purpose of giving consent. Rather it relied on the
existence of a duty on the part of the doctor to act in order to preserve the life and health of his patient. While this might lead to an
argument that where good surgery demands a certain operation
the doctor may be justified in exceeding the terms of consent, the
court said that "good surgery" was too general, vague and ambiguous to be the basis of the defense. This court talked in terms of
"assault and battery" and said that but for the defense of an
emergency, the action would be barred by the statute of limitations
for assault and battery.
In. Gregoris v. Manos,1'20 the doctor was employed to treat the
groin, appendix and rectum of the patient and in the course of
such treatment injected a needle into a cyst to withdraw fluid. It
appears that a vein was torn and the doctor operated to tie off this
vein. The patient brought an action, alleging in the original and
two amended- petitions that the operation was performed without
his consent, but omitting this allegation in the third amended complaint which was framed in terms of negligence. The appellate court
affirmed judgment for the defendant doctors, saying that had the
119. Marshall v. Curry, (1933) 3 D.L.R. 260, 60 Can. Crm. Cas. 136
(Nov.Scot. Sup. Ct 1933).

120. 40 N.E2d 466 (Ohio App. 1941).
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plaintiff retained the allegation of operation without consent lie
would have been entitled to a charge that if the jury found no
consent to the operation the plaintiff should recover. Here, however, there was some indication that the entire course of treatment
had been directly contrary to the description given to the patient
by the doctor prior to the insertion of the needle. The argument
seems fairly strong that if there was consent to the original treatment and if there was no negligence in that treatment itself, the
doctor should be justified in performing an operation to prevent
the internal bleeding which would have followed the tearing of
the vein.
In several cases where doctors have performed operations to
remove needles,121 pads, 122 and other instruments

2

which have

been left nonnegligently in the body, the courts have found no
liability for the second operation. These may be reconciled with such
decisions as the Franklyn, Markart and Gregoris decisions on the
basis that in one set of cases there is immediate need for such unauthorized conduct while in the latter cases there is no such
immediacy No very definite guide to the presence of an "emergency" can be developed from the cases, however. It seems likely
that the resolution of the question of liability in such cases will
ultimately turn on expert evidence as to whether a reasonable doctor
would consider that an "emergency" existed and proceed to operate.
In summary, in the cases involving operations or treatment
which went beyond the scope of the patients' consent, the courts
predominantly classify the defendant's conduct as an assault and
battery When the operation performed is completely unauthorized,
as in Physicians' & Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, or where
it is performed on an entirely unauthorized portion of the body, as
in Mohr v. Williams, Hively v. Higgs, Reddington v. Clayman,
Valdez v. Percy, or Franklyn v. Peabody,or varies greatly from the
character of the operation as consented to, as in Pratt v. Davis,
Wells v. Van Nort, Tabor v. Scobee, Paulsen v. Gundersen, Bonner v. Moran, Wall v. Brim or Maercklen v. Smith, the doctor
must have realized that he was going outside the scope of the permitted operation and so his conduct is properly classified as "intentional" in the sense that he knows he has invaded an interest of the
plaintiff-patient. Where such invasion results in substantial harm
to the patient, as in the Dray, Valdez, Paulsen, Bonner, Wall,
Maercklem and Franklyncases, there seems great justification for a
121. HIgley v. Jeffrey, 44 Wyo. 37, 8 P.2d 96 (1932).
122. Barnett's Adm'r v. Brand, 165 Ky. 616, 177 S.W 461 (1915).
123. Delahunt v. Finton, 244 Mich. 226, 221 N.W 168 (1928).

1957]

UNAUTHORIZED MEDICAL TREATMENT

doctrinal classification of the conduct as "assault and battery."
When, however, there is no substantial showing that the conduct
of the defendant has actually caused any harm to the patient other
than the infliction of incidental parn and suffering, which probably
is no greater than that which would result from the consented-to
operation or from continuation of the patient's infirmity, and where
the treatment in point of fact may have benefited the patient by removing a source of greater illness in the future, as in Mohlr, Hively,
Reddington, Pratt, Wells and Tabor, the designation of the defendant's conduct as an "assault and battery" seems justified
primarily in terms of protecting the patient's interest in making
his own decisions as to what operations shall be performed. The
same seems to be true in a case like Nolan v. Kecidjian, where there
is no serious harm and perhaps no serious deviation from the terms
of the consent. In the cases where the patient has come to the
doctor with the primary objective of obtaining relief from his infirmity, as in most of the cases of abdominal surgery, and where
the nature of the infirmity cannot be readily determined prior to
the operation itself, there is less reason to say that the doctor has
acted "intentionally" in invading an interest of the plaintiff-patient,
inasmuch as there may be some question as to just what was the
scope of consent. This certainly seems arguable in cases such as
King v. Carney, Russell v. Jackson, Wheeler v. Barker,Zoterell v.
Repp, Adanm v. Boyce and McGumre v. Rix, although in those
cases the courts rely more on a broad interpretation of consent. The
argument might also be applied in Pratt, Wells and Tabor, where
the patient's lack of actual consent is a bit clearer, or in Church v.
Adler, In re Johnson's Estate, Slater v. Baker & Stapleton and
Boydston v. Giltner, where there is no showing of any real harm
resulting from the defendant's deviation from consent and the courts
look instead to whether the defendant conducted himself in accordance with the standards of the profession. In cases where an emergency has arisen due to a condition of the patient's body which was
not foreseen at the time of obtaining consent, the courts have
adopted an approach of giving the doctor broad discretion. Where
the conduct of the defendant is designed to remedy an emergency
arising during the operation through no fault on the part of the
doctor himself, the designation of the defendant's conduct as an
assault and battery appears to serve little or no purpose, since the
ultimate decision as to whether he will be liable or not is likely
to be made on the basis of what a reasonable physician would do
under like circumstances. All of this suggests that a re-evaluation
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of the proper classification of these situations might be made, but
such reappraisal will be deferred until the last portion of this study
Mistake -n Operations
A third general category into which cases involving unauthorized operations or medical treatment may fall is that of mistake, the
situation in which the doctor believes that he is remaining within
the terms of the patient's consent but fails to do so through inadvertence.
Typical of this classification are the cases involving the extraction of teeth. Throne v. Wandell'2 4 involved a patient who had been
sent to the defendant dentist by her regular dentist for the purpose
of having an X-ray made of her teeth. The regular dentist had
marked the teeth which he wanted X-rayed on a chart which bore
the legend, "Kindly mark teeth to be extracted." The defendant
removed the teeth instead of X-raying them. The court permitted
the patient to recover on an assault charge. In Ehlen v. Burrows,'2 '
the court treated the removal of sound teeth as an "assault," but
said that the cause of action fell within the same statute of limitations
as that for negligence. In a later case in California in which the
patient alleged both negligence and assault, it was held that the
trial court could properly charge on both counts although an unauthorized operation such as removal of sound teeth would be an
assault and "negligence has nothing to do with it.""' On the other
hand, in Hershey v. Peake, 27 the court classified the removal of
sound teeth as negligence rather than an intentional wrong. The
dentist in that case was instructed to remove three teeth from the
patient's upper left jaw but instead pulled the corresponding teeth
in the upper right jaw The court said that in this situation the
dentist had merely "neglected to use reasonable and ordinary care
and skill
and
carelessly disregarded the knowledge he had
obtained from the examination of the X-ray photograph and his
own examination of plaintiff's jaw
"128 In accord are McClees v
Cohen129 and Krompoltz v. Hyman, " although in the latter the
court does say that the situation is one which might be classified as
"wanton recklessness." And where the dentist testified that he removed the teeth because he reasonably believed that they were diseased, the court said that although there was no evidence of negli124. 176 Wis. 97, 186 N.W 146 (1922).
125.
126.
127
128.

51 Cal. App. 2d 141, 124 P.2d 82 (1942).
Estrada v. Orwitz, 75 Cal. App. 2d 54, 170 P.2d 43 (1946)
115 Kan. 562, 223 Pac. 1113 (1924)
Id. at 565, 223 Pac. at 1114.

130.

70 Pa. Super. 581 (1919)

129. 158 Md. 60, 148 Atl. 124 (1930)
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gence or "malpractice," the question of whether the defendant had
removed the sound teeth with or without the consent of the plaintiff
would be a question of fact for the jury,"'1 and by implication, a
finding of no consent would be treated as establishing an assault
and battery.
In Samuelson v. Taylor,1 12 the doctor appears to have confused
the plaintiff with some other patient and as a result gave a treatment which might have been reasonable for the other patient but
which caused infection in the plaintiff's antrum. The court said that
liability would be predicated on treating the plaintiff under a mistake m identity. Gill v. Selling 33 presented much the same problem,
the patient being subjected to a spinal tap which was unnecessary
for her but which should have been given to another patient. The
court spoke in terms of negligence in subjecting the patient to such
unnecessary treatment, although it seems clear that there was no
consent to the treatment since the patient did not comprehend what
3
was being done. In Necolayff v. Genesee Hospital,2
' the court
allowed recovery by a patient who had been given a blood transfusion intended for another patient, which resulted in chills and
eventually mental disease. The court said that this was at least
negligence and possibly as assault.
In Sullivan v. McGraw,'" the doctor operated on the wrong leg,
apparently as a result of some confusion as to which leg was in fact
diseased. The patient brought action, phrasing his complaint in
terms of negligence. The court affirmed recovery on this theory In
Moos v. United States,"" the plaintiff had entered the Veterans'
Hospital for the purpose of having surgical work done on his left
leg which had been injured in military service. Plaintiff alleged
in his complaint that while he was anaesthetized the hospital's employees "negligently transferred the situs of the operation and
operated upon the right leg and hip of the plaintiff," to which operation he had given no consent. The United States District Court in
Minnesota dismissed the complaint brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act on the ground that the operation constituted an assault
and battery and not merely negligence,' although the court recog131. Rosenthal v. Hasbrouck, 161 N.Y. Supp. 354 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1st Dep't 1916).
132. 160 Wash. 369, 295 Pac. 113 (1931).

133.
134.
135.
136.

125 Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812, 58 A.L.R. 1556 (1928).
296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947).
118 Mich. 39,76 N.W. 149 (1898).
118 F. Supp. 275 (D.Minn. 1954).

137. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1952) specifically excludes from the coverage
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, "any claim arising out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process.
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights."
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nized that a claim of negligence might also have been made. The
court relied on Mohr v. Williams, Wall v. Brim and Bonner v.
Moran. The decision was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. 188 It has
been pointed out elsewhere in this Review that the words "assault
and battery" probably were inserted as an exception to the Tort
Claims Act to exclude liability for deliberate attacks upon plaintiffs and could be interpreted as not covering the present situation.""
It has long been accepted torts doctrine that where the defendant
acts with the intent to accomplish a result which constitutes an
invasion of the interests of the plaintiff, he will not be excused by
mistake. 40 It is also well established that the intent to cause a
certain physical consequence rather than the intent to cause harm
or injury is the critical factor. 1 ' Therefore, where a doctor performs an operation or renders teatment which he knows if not consented to will constitute an invasion of the patient's right to be left
alone and which is in fact harmful, there seems to be sufficient basis
for characterizing his conduct as a battery Yet in such cases as
Hershey v. Peake, McClees v. Cohen, Gill v. Selling, Necolayff v.
Genesee Hospitaland Sullivan v. McGraw, the courts talk primarily
in terms of negligence and lack of due care on the part of the doctor
Where the patient has in fact consented to some operation, as in the
Hershey, McClees and Sullivan cases, it may be argued that the real
basis for complaint is the doctor's failure to take proper care in
determining what should be done. But where, as in Gill and Necolayff, there is a mistake as to the identity of the patient, this argu138. 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955).
139. 38 Minn. L. Rev. 890 (1954), noting the district court decision. It
is probably significant that the other cases in which the "assault and battery"
exception has been applied have in fact involved deliberate attacks or
assaults United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956) (air force
pilot buzzing town) Morton v. United States, 228 F.2d 431 (D.C. Cir.
1955), cert. dented, 350 U.S. 975 (1956) (confinement as mental defective and
subjection to mental and physical cruelty), Stepp v. United States, 207 F.2d
909 (4th Cir. 1953) (civilian seaman shot by army guard), United States v.
Hambleton, 185 F2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950) ("grilling" of female by army
sergeant including excessive questioning concerning delicate personal subjects not connected with investigation) , Jones v. FBI, 139 F Supp. 38
(D.Md. 1956) (severe abuse, threats, etc., to wife and children of plaintiff
as well as false imprisonment), Rufino v. United States, 126 F Supp. 132
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (assault upon patient by physicians), Panella v. United
States, 117 F Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), reversed, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
1954) (stabbing of one inmate of U.S. Public Health Service Hospital by another inmate, held not within exception which applies only to assaults of
employees).
140. See Prosser, Torts 80-82 (2d ed. 1955) , Restatement, Torts § 18,
comment g (1934), Whittier, Mistake in the Law of Torts, 15 Harv. L. Rev.
335 (1902).
141. See Prosser, Torts 29 (2d ed. 1955) , Restatement, Torts §§ 13,
comments d and e, 16, 18, comment h, 20 (1934)
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ment loses its weight. Perhaps these courts are influenced by the
fact that the patients were conscious at the time and may have
acquiesced in the treatment, although a persuasive case could be
made for the proposition that the patient in each of these cases was
not fully cognizant of what was occurring and can hardly be considered to have consented understandingly.
One other type of mistake relating to operations renmains to be
mentioned. This is a mistake in diagnosis. In most of the cases
discussed in this article, the patient's major concern is in being
'cured. His or her consent to specific treatment is apt to be based
upon the diagnosis of the doctor as to what is the nature of his
infirmity and what steps are necessary to correct it. In many of the
cases there appears to have been an erroneous diagnosis. 142- In a
few of them, the patient has specifically charged the doctor with
negligence in diagnosis. 1 - 3 Where there has been a mistake in
diagnosis the limitations on consent are likely to be a reflectih of
this error. If this situation is evident from the facts of the case before
it, a court may take one of two positions: (1) It may say that the
patient has consented to such treatment or operation as will cure
his infirmities and that the diagnosis is part of such treatment.
142. The most obvious case is Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W.
12, 1 L.R.A. (n.s.) 439 (1905), where the defendant diagnosed serious disease
m the right ear and did not suggest that there was anything wrong with the
left, but discovered later that the left ear was the more seriously diseased and
operated upon it. Some other examples are: Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th
Cir. 1943), (diagnosis of simple operation, actual operation serious) ; Wheeler
v. Barker, 132 Cal. App. 2d 788, 208 P.2d 68 (1950) (proposal to remove
only small tumor and possibly one ovary, discovery of large tumor and
performance of subtotal hysterectomy), Adams v. Boyce, 37 Cal. App. 2d
541, 99 P.2d 1044, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 694 (1940) (proposed use of large
magnet to remove foreign substance from eye, operation required cutting of
eye ball), Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943) (diagnosis of tubal pregnancy, discovery of acute appendicitis and diseased fallopian tubes) ; Beringer v. Lackner, 331 Ill. App. 591, 73 N.E.2d 620 (1947)
(proposed currettement, performance of vaginal hysterectomy), Zoterell
v. Repp, 187 Mich. 319, 153 N.W 692 (1915) (apparent diagnosis of minor
difficulty, discovery of diseased ovaries), Rothe v. Hull, 353 Mo. 926, 180
S.W.2d 7 (1944) (diagnosis of appendicitis, discovery of diseased fallopian
tubes); Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L. (54 Vroom) 20, 83 At. 948 (1912)
(diagnosis of herna in left groin, discovery of hernia in right) ; King v.
Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270, 26 A.L.R. 1032 (1922) (diagnosis of
lacerated uterus, discovery of infected ovaries and fallopian tubes), Hively
v. I-Eggs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 Pac. 363, 53 A.L.R. 1052 (1927) (proposed
operation on septum of nose, actual operation on tonsils), Paulsen v. Gundersen, 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W 448 (1935) (diagnosis of simple mastoid
operation; radical mastoid operation performed) ; Marshall v. Curry, (1933)
3 D.L.R. 260, 60 Can. Crim. Cas. 136 (Nov. Scot. Sup. Ct. 1933) (diagnosis
of hernia only, actual operation involved removal of testicle).
143. See, e.g., Edwards v. Roberts, 12 Ga. App. 140, 76 S.E. 1054
(1913) ; Ehlen v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App. 2d 141, 124 P.2d 82 (1942) ; Bakewell
v. Kahle, 125 Mont. 89, 232 P.2d 127 (1951) ; In re Johnson's Estate, 145 Neb.
333, 16 N.W.2d 504 (1944).
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Therefore, unless there is actual negligence in the diagnosis the
patient has no basis for complaint. (2) It may say that the patient
is entitled to make his own decisions as to what shall be done with
his body and to make these decisions on the basis of correct facts.
Therefore, when the doctor discovers that his diagnosis is incorrect
he should obtain the consent of the patient if this is practicable.
Under this latter theory, the fact that the unforeseen condition
threatens serious harm to the patient and that there is a necessity
for immediate action, or the seriousness of the shock of a second
operation, may justify the doctor in acting without obtaining ex"
press consent. These two arguments may apply equally to the
situations in which there has been express prohibition, to the extent
that the prohibition is based on inadequate knowledge of the facts
1 4

by the patient.
A

REAPPRAISAL OF THE LAW OF UNAUTHORIZED OPERATIONS

This study of cases involving unauthorized operations or medical treatment indicates the existence of a great diversity of factual
situations ranging from a case such as Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hospital, in which the doctor operated in direct violation
of express prohibitions of the patient and the operation resulted
in serious physical injury, to cases such as Mohr v. Williams or
Prattv. Dams, in which the operation was done without the express
consent of the patient but probably caused no serious harm to the
patient and in point of fact may have conferred some benefit. letween these two extremes lie cases in which there was only a
limitation upon a general scope of consent the violation of which
did not seriously injure the patient, as in Rolater v Strain, and
cases in which there was no express prohibition but substantial harm
resulted to the patient from an operation which went beyond the
scope of express consent, as in Wall v. Brimt or Paulsen v. Gundersen. Yet the courts tend to group together all of these diverse fact
situations under the category of "assault and battery" and rely
upon any one of the early cases as authority for imposing liability
upon the doctor which may differ substantially from the nature
and scope of liability in a general malpractice action." At the same
time, some courts have broken away from this categorization of the
unauthorized operation and have treated it as "malpractice" for
the purpose of applying a general statute of limitations rather than
144. See, e.g., Bakewell v. Kahle, 125 Mont. 89, 232 P.2d 127 (1951),
Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96, 50 L.R.A. (n.s.) 880 (1913)
145. See discussion pp. 383-84 supra.
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the shorter statute normally applicable to assault and battery
claims;1 and occasionally a court has suggested that a doctor
might be excused from liability m such a case upon a showing of
good medical practice, 4 7 though this is anything but uniform. "'
This apparently inconsistent application of theory and the possibility of some inequity in classifying the attempts of a physician
or surgeon to render reasonable assistance to a patient by the
onerous title of "assault and battery," led the present author to a reappraisal of the law to be applied in these varied situations. The
main thrust of this reappraisal was to see whether all of the malpractice claims could not be judged by the same standard, i.e., has
the defendant doctor compiled with the standard of care established
by the practice of a reasonable and ordinary doctor under similar
circumstances ?
Traditionally the distinction between an "assault and battery"
and a "negligent tort" has been drawn on the basis of the existence
or nonexistence of "intent," that state of mind in which the actor
acts for the purpose of accomplishing a given consequence or acts
with knowledge that such a consequence is substantially certain to
occur, although there need be no showing of a hostile or malicious
purpose or of an intent to do harm. In all of the cases discussed
in this article, the physician knew what he was doing; he knew that
he was performing a certain operation or that he was rendering
certain treatment affecting the body of the patient. In all but a
few of the cases it is to be inferred that he also knew that there was
no specific assent to such operation or treatment, and in some of
those few the lack of such knowledge was the result of mistake as
to the identity of the patient or the identity of a particular portion
of the body to be treated, neither of which would constitute a defense. In each of the cases there has been a legal "harm" in the
sense of a physically harmful invasion of the body of the plaintiff146. E.g., Hershey v. Peake, 115 Kan. 562, 223 Pac. 1113 (1924); McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 AtL 124 (1930) ; Burke v. Maryland, 149
Minn. 481, 184 N.W. 32 (1921) ; Francis v. Brooks, 20 Oluo App. 136, 156
N.E. 609 (1926) ; White v. Hirshfield, 108 Okla. 263, 236 Pac. 406 (1925),

Physicians' and Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111 P.2d

568 (1941) ; Klingbeil v. Saucerman, 165 Wis. 60, 160 NAV 1051, 1 A.L.R.
1311 (1917).
147. Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954) ; Preston
v. Hubbell, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 196 P.2d 113 (1948) ; Cf. Church v. Alder,
350 Ill. App. 471, 113 N.E.2d 327 (1953) ; Zink v. Basham, 164 Kan. 456, 190
P.2d 203 (1948) ; Sullivan v. McGraw, 118 Mich. 39, 76 N.W 149 (1893),
In re Johnson's Estate, 145 Neb. 333, 16 N.W.2d 504 (1944) ; Gill v. Selling,
125 Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812, 58 A.L.R. 1556 (1928).
148. Perry v. Hodgson, 168 Ga. 678, 148 S.E. 659 (1929) ; Franklyn v.
Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N.W 681 (1930), Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn.
261, 104 N.W. 12, 1 L.R.A. (n.s.) 439 (1905).
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patient or an interference with the patient's personal integrity or
right to determine what shall and shall not be done with his body
Following these traditional lines of analysis, one would conclude
that except in a very rare case, such as a true emergency, the
doctor who acts without the consent of the patient is guilty of an
assault and battery
What appears to distinguish the case of the unauthorized operation from traditional assault and battery cases is the fact that in
almost all of the cases, the doctor is acting in relative good faith
for the benefit of the patient. It is true that in some cases the results are not in fact beneficial, but the courts have stated repeatedly
that doctors are not insurers.' 49 The traditional assault and battery,
on the other hand, involves a defendant who is acting for the most
part out of malice or in a manner which is generally considered as
"anti-social." And in general the assaulter and batterer is not seeking to confer any benefit upon the plaintiff, even though he may
believe, as Dean Prosser has suggested, that he is complimenting the
plaintiff by his amatory advances.'" This leads to the conclusion
that there is some basis for separating most of the cases discussed
in this paper from the traditional assault and battery At the same
time, there appears to be justification for retaining the "assault and
battery" classification for such situations as occurred in Bryan v
Grace, Wellnan v.Drake and Keen v. Coleman,'" as well as the
"fraud" cases.15 2 Operations, declared to be anti-social in their very
nature by statutes making their performance a crime, deserve specialized treatment.' 5 '
Support for the proposition that an unauthorized operation
should not be treated as an assault and battery, may be found in
such cases as Hershey v. Peake,154 in which the doctor had removed
sound teeth instead of diseased teeth without any evidence appearing which would explain such an error. In that case the court said,
"The fundamental distinction between assault and battery on the one
hand and negligence such as would constitute malpractice, on the
other, is that the former is intentional and the latter unintentional," 15 5 and then proceeded to classify the conduct of the defendant as
negligent only Such classification might be explained on the ground
149. See cases cited note 7 supra.
150. Prosser, Torts 32 (2d ed. 1955).
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

These cases are discussed pp. 393-94 supra.
These cases are discussed pp. 394-95 supra.
These cases are discussed p. 395 supra.
115 Kan. 562, 223 Pac. 1113 (1924).
Id. at 565, 223 Pac. at 1114.
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that the question before the court was the applicability of a one year
statute of limitations for assault and that the court was motivated
by a desire to give the patient as full protection from this sort of
misconduct on the part of a doctor or dentist as would occur if there
were mismanagement of a drill. The same distinction has been
made m a case involving a doctor's intoxicated attempt to remove
a catheter from a patient's bladder over the protest of the patient. 1"
The patient alleged in his complaint that the doctor was so unsteady
on his feet that he fell and tore the catheter from the patient's body.
The eourt treated the entire episode as one of negligence, in spite
of the fact that there had been express protest and serious harm resulting to the patient. In a third case the patient alleged, and the
court agreed, that there had been no consent to an operation upon
her esophagus in the course of which the esophagus was punctured.1,57 The court treated this as negligence, saying:
...we believe that a reasonable interpretation of the term "assault and battery," as used in the policy provision quoted, is that
it means a wilful or intentional, an unlawful or criminal, act of
violence, not an incident such as we have here where, obviously,
failure to obtain the patient's consent was due to inadvertence.
. . All doctors know they should have their patient's consent
to an operation or render themselves liable, and no sensible practitioner would deliberately expose himself to such a risk...
In this case failure to obtain the patient's consent was unintentional. It was a mere oversight. It did not constitute "assault
and battery." It was an act of malpractice, and, in our judgment,
it was covered by the policies.15s
The court was interpreting a policy of malpractice insurance and
perhaps the interpretation most favorable to the insured and least
favorable to the company justifies this apparent rejection of the
weight of authority. It may be that in other circumstances, where
the action is between patient and doctor individually and the doctor
seeks to establish that what he did was in accordance with wellrecognized medical practice, the court will withdraw from this position. But until such withdrawal is clear, the court's opinion, together
with the two earlier ones and others dealing with the problem of
the statute of limitations tend to support treatment of all malpractice
actions alike. Although the objection may be made to reliance upon
these cases that they were all decided most favorably for the patient,
it should be noted that some courts in classifying unauthorized
156. Maddox v. Neptune, 175 Kan. 465, 264 P2d 1073 (1953).
157 Shehee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 122 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La.
1954).
158. Id. at 6.
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operations adopt terminology which would not be most favorable to
the patient. 1 9
It may be argued that to adopt a standard of conduct of the
established practice of medicine and surgery is to deny recovery
in most of the cases mentioned, since the repeated instances of unauthorized treatment indicate that this may be customary and accepted practice. Furthermore, it may be argued, to adopt such a
standard is to deny protection to the right of the patient to have his
body secure from any and all unconsented-to touching, a right
which has been recognized by the common law for generations. One
partial answer to this line of argument is made by the court in the
Shehee 60 case when it says that no reputable doctor will operate
without the patient's consent and then designates such conduct as
malpractice. But more than this, the author believes that the serious
peril which is foreseen by the hypothetical arguer does not really
exist for two reasons
(1) Without having any actual proof, the author believes that
a good many of the cases involving unauthorized operations are
brought by patients who have discovered that the cure which they
believed would result has not occurred, or a case may be brought
by a patient who has lost what he believes to be a vital organ but
which in fact is either functionless or diseased.
(2) An additional, and more likely, reason for such actions
appears to be a lack of communication between doctor and patient,
that is, the doctor frequently has failed to explain to the patient the
real meaning of a medical term, or the danger involved in a particular operation, or the danger of continued existence of certain conditions of the body This latter reason may apply not only to those
cases in which the lack of authorization is based on a material
159. In Cady v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 346, 276 Pac. 30 (1924), the court

indicated that there could never be an assault and battery charge where
there was any contractual relation between the doctor and patient, without
making it clear that deviation from the terms of the contract would be anything more than negligence. This was followed by Maercklein v. Smith, 129
Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954), discussed at p. 412 .rpra,in wich the court
treated the case as one for "negligence" and specifically said that it was not
clear whether there had been sufficient deviation from the express terms
of the contract to constitute negligence, although the fact situation seems to
fit the "assault and battery" category as stated in other cases. In Marshall

v. Curry, (1933) 3 D.L.R. 260, 60 Can. Crim. Cas. 136 (Nov. Scot. Sup. Ct.

1933), the court stated that if the doctor were not justifiably excused by an
emergency situation the claim of the patient would be barred by the statute
of limitations applied to assault and battery actions, rather than relying on
the longer period of limitations for general negligence which would normally
apply to malpractice actions.
160. Shehee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 122 F Supp. I (W.D. La.
1954).
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change in the character of the operation, as in Wall v. Brim or Paulsen v. Gudersen, but also may be the reason for the patient's claim
of lack of authorization where the scope of the operation has extended beyond what the patient believed to be the limits of his
consent, as in Wells v. Van Nort or Pratt v. Davis. In these latter
cases it seems likely that the doctor did not fully explain to the
patient that there was considerable uncertainty as to the precise
nature of the infirmity and that there was some possibility that other
organs were diseased.
If the sole basis or reason for bringing an action is the former,
i.e., disappointment as to the outcome of the operation, there is no
real loss in denying recovery. On the other hand, serious objection
may be raised to denying recovery where the reason for bringing the
action is failure of communication by doctor to patient. The proper
solution of this problem, in the opinion of the author, is to recognize that the doctor owes a duty to his patient to make reasonable
disclosure of all significant facts, t.e., the nature of the infirmity
(so far as reasonably possible), the nature of the operation and
some of the more probable consequences and difficulties inherent in
the proposed operation. It may be said that a doctor who fails to
perform this duty is guilty of malpractice. This argument has in
fact been made in two cases
In Hunt v. Bradslhw,161 a piece of metal had entered the plaintiff's neck, but had given him little or no trouble. The doctor after
making X-ray examinations, advised the patient that the metal was
working down through his body and would endanger the heart if
not removed. In reply to the patient's inquiry as to whether the
operation would be a serious one, the doctor said that there was
nothing to it, that it was very simple. It appeared that in fact the
location of the piece of metal made it reasonably likely that in the
course of operation the blood supply to a certain bundle of nerves
might be cut off, which could result in partial paralysis. In fact
this occurred. The patient sued alleging negligence on the part of
the doctor in not properly advising him of the dangers of the operation, along with other charges of negligence. The appellate court
affirmed a nonsuit, saying:
It is understandable the surgeon wanted to reassure the patient
so that he would not go to the operating room unduly apprehensive. Failure to explain the risk involved, therefore, may be
considered a mistake on the part of the surgeon, but under the
161. 242 N.C. 517, 88 E.E2d 762 (1955), Noted, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 897
(1956).
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facts cannot be deemed such want of ordinary care as to import
liability 162
Of course, it seems hard to the patient in apparent good health
that he should be advised to undergo an operation, and upon
regaining consciousness finds that he has lost the use of an arm
for the remainder of his life. Infallibility in human beings is not
attainable. The law recognizes, and we think properly so, that
the surgeon's hand, with its skill and training, is, after all, a
human hand, guided by a human brain in a procedure in which
the margin between safety and danger sometimes measures
little more than the thickness of a sheet of paper. The plaintiff's
case fails because of lack of expert testimony that the defendant
failed, either to exercise due care in the operation, or to use his
best judgment in advising it.1"3
In a somewhat older case from Ontario, Kinney v. Lockwood
Clinic, Ltd.,164 the patient had come to the defendant doctors to see
if they could do anything about a swelling in the palm of her hand.
One of the doctors informed her that she suffered from Dupuytrcn's
Contraction and that it would be wise to have an operation. There
apparently was some conflict in the testimony, but plaintiff's version
was that the doctor informed her that the operation would be a
"simple" one, that she would be out of the hospital within three days
and would have the complete use of her hand at the end of three
weeks. The plaintiff then submitted to the operation, which was unsuccessful. She sued alleging that the operation performed was
"serious, precarious and dangerous" and that the defendants had
negligently failed to inform her of the nature of the operation. There
was some showing that the percentage of success in operations of
this type was not overwhelming, and that the disease or infirmity
itself sometimes gave no serious trouble to the patient and sometimes moved very quickly to cripple the patient's hand. The trial
court gave judgment for the plaintiff, saying
the duty of the defendants was to enlighten the patient's
mind in a plain and reasonable way as to what her ailment was,
as to what were the risks of operating promptly, what were the
risks of delaying the operation, and what the risks of not operating at all. Having discharged that duty, it was the duty of the
surgeons to secure from the patient a decision or consent as to
what course was to be followed, and if that decision or consent
is not had and the surgeons operate in a case like this and the
operation turns out badly and damages ensue, the surgeons are
liable."6 5
162. Id. at 523, 88 S.E.2d at 766.
163. Id. at 524, 88 S.E.2d at 766.
164. (1931) Ont. 438, (1931) 4 D.L.R. 906 (Sup. Ct.).
165. Id. at 442, (1931) 4 D.L.R. at 907
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On appeal this judgment was reversed."' 0 The Court of Appeal (or
two of its members) agreed that there should be liability if the
doctor had failed to explain the general nature of the operation, but
found there was sufficient evidence of such explanation to make a
jury question. Two of the judges said that there was no obligation
to inform the plaintiff as to the seriousness of the operation or that
the disease would or would not progress rapidly so long as the
doctors themselves did not have a firm belief on these subjects.
The court did not wholly reject the theory of a duty of disclosure,
however, since one of the judges concluded:
The relationship between the defendant Stoddart and the plaintiff was that of surgeon and patient, and as such the duty cast
upon the surgeon was to deal honestly with the patient as to the
necessity, character and importance of the operation and its
probable consequences and whether success might reasonably
be expected to ameliorate or remove the trouble, but that such
duty does not extend to warning the patient of the dangers
incident to, or possible in, any operation, nor to details calculated
to frighten or distress the patient. 1 7
The dissenting judge supported the trial court's opinion.
It should be noted that both of these cases raise the point that
although the doctor may have some obligation to disclose facts to
the patient, the possibility of creating fright or nervous tension on
the part of the patient may deter him from makang a detailed disclosure. Another qualification may be that a good deal of what
might go into a diagnosis and prognosis of a case can hardly be
classified as "fact" and lies largely in the realm of supposition, or
hunch based on experience. Some question may be raised as to
the extent to which the doctor should be under an obligation to
discuss such conclusions with the patient and whether he can intelligibly communicate the significance of certain "facts" or the
weight to be given certain conclusions without giving a short
course in medicine and surgery Some of the difficulties inherent in
imposing any such duty have been discussed elsewhere. 168
At this point some reference should be made to a recent symposium review of Dr. Joseph Fletcher's book, Morals and Medicine. 69 Dr. Fletcher emphasizes, particularly in the chapter, "Medi166. Kenny v. Lockvood, (1932) Ont. 141, (1932) 1 D.L.RL 507 (Ct.
App.).
167. Id. at 160-61, (1932) 1 D.L.R. at 525.
168. See, e.g., Lund, The Doctor, the Patient and the Truth, 19 Tenn.
L. Rev. 344 (1946), Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific
Diagitwsis from PatientSick with Sertous or FatalIllness, 19 Tein. L. Rev.

349 (1946).
169. Symposium: Morals, Medicine and the Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1157 (1956).
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cal Diagnosis Our Right to Know the Truth," the right of the
patient to be informed as to the nature of his illness and to make
decisions for himself. It is significant that all six commentators"' on
the book and on this particular point agreed that the patient has a
"right" to know the truth, but almost uniformly doubted that such
a right should be subject to legal enforcement. This attitude of reluctance toward legal remedies apparently grows out of doubt as to
whether anyone can objectively establish "the truth" or "the facts"
in medical cases and doubt as to the practicability of administration
of legal obligations to tell all. Some of this doubt may rise from the
fact that the major emphasis is placed on the question of whether
the doctor need tell the patient the "truth" about the imminence of
death. The commentators, and Dr. Fletcher himself, do not address
themselves to the particular problem before us, s.e., whether the
doctor has an obligation to explain to the patient in language as
simple as necessary the nature of the ailment, the nature of the
proposed treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives,
and perhaps the risks of unfortunate results or unforeseen conditions
within the body It would appear that the administration of such an
obligation, by imposing liability for malpractice if the operation
were performed without such explanation where explanation could
reasonably be made, would not present insurmountable obstacles.
This is particularly true if one considers that a good number of
the cases involving the question of consent probably turn on the
extent to which the patient was informed of the nature of the
operation and then submitted to it.
Even though a combination of a presumption that no reputable
doctor would operate without his patient's consent and an obligation on the part of the doctor to make reasonable disclosure to the
patient in obtaining that consent may meet the argument that the
adoption of a "reasonable doctor" standard for all malpractice cases
170. The six participants in the symposium, in addition to Professor

Thomas Cowan of Rutgers University Law School, who wrote the introductory materials, were. Horace M. Kallen, Research Professor in Social Phllosophy and Professor Emeritus of the Graduate Faculty of Political and
Social Science, New School for Social Research, "An Ethic of Freedom A
Philosopher's View," id. at 1164, Rev. Joseph D. Hassett, S.J., "Freedom and
Order Before God. A Catholic View," id. at 1170; Paul Ramsey, Professor
of Religion, Princeton University, "Freedom and Responsibility in Medical
and Sex Ethics A Protestant View," id at 1190; Rabbi Emanuel Rackman,
"Morality in Medico-Legal Problems A Jewish View," id. at 1205, I. Phillips
Frohman, M.D., "Vexing Problems in Forensic Medicine A Physician's
View," id. at 1215, Harry Kalven, Jr., Professor of Law, University of
Chicago, "A Special Corner of Civil Liberties A Legal View I," id. at 1223,
Morris Ploscowe, Member of New York Bar and Former New York City
Magistrate, "The Place of Law in Medico-Moral Problems A Legal View
II," id. at 1238.
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would permit wholesale operation without consent, there remains
the point that this will undermine the patient's long established right
to have his body secure from unwanted touching. One simple answer
to this argument would be that in the large majority of these
cases the patient has submitted himself to some touching by the
doctor and that if all that is being protected is his personal dignity
the countervailing policy of allowing the doctor reasonable discretion in using his sldll for the benefit of the patient would appear to
justify doing away with "assault and battery" charges. Where
there has been a total lack of consent, as m Schloendorff or possibly
Physicians' and Dentists' Bumness Bureau v. Dray,"7 it seems
highly unlikely that there will be much question as to whether
tus is "reasonable" or "proper" medical practice. Furthermore, if
the liability of the doctor should include punitive character, thils
may be achieved by terming this particular conduct "wanton,"
"recklessness" or some other appropriate epithet which will designate an ex reme deviation from the normal standard, assuming that
this is, in the mind of the trier of fact, such an extreme deviation.
Between these two extremes are the situations in which there has
been some harm resulting from an operation which goes outside the
scope of the express consent or violates some limitations placed on a
general submission to the doctor's care. Here the balancing of the
interest in protecting doctors m the exercise of professional discretion and the interest of protecting personal integrity of patients may
be left to the trier of fact. One factor which the trier of fact will
have to consider in making this determination in a particular case,
is whether the personal integrity being protected is a somewhat
unrealistic right in view of the probability that the patient does not
have the capacity to make intelligent decisions on many questions
of medicine and surgery and in general has entrusted lumself to the
doctor's care. This is not to suggest that it may not be appropriate
for the patient to impose limitations on the nature of the operation
and such items as the use of spinal or general anaesthetic, but it is
intended to raise the question of whether Miss Strain, if asked prior
to the operation whether the doctor might remove a non-functional
bone in order to drain the infection in her great toe, would have
remained adament in her requirement that no bones be removed.
This proposition assumes that doctors are generally to be trusted
not to engage in dangerous operations or treatment without the
consent of the patient and that the doctor is exercising his skill
for the benefit of the patient. But inasmuch as this assumption
171. 8 Wash. 2d 38, 11 P.2d 568 (1941), discussed at pp. 405-06 supra.
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is a basic tenet of medical science it seems a proper one.
One major difficulty remains, and it may well be a decisive one
in a reappraisal of the law on this subject. The difficulty is the
question of proof. Who is to determine what is reasonable and prudent medical practice? In cases such as Moos v. United States or
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, the deviation from
the standard may be sufficiently obvious so that the jury may determine liability without reliance upon medical expert witnesses. And
in a case such as Jackovach v. Yocum,17 2 where the patient was
unconscious and his life was threatened if immediate action was not
taken, or Delahuntv. Finton,713 where an instrument became trapped
inside the body, the jury may determine that any reasonable doctor
would act without consent for the benefit of the patient. But in such
cases as Mohr v. Williams or Tabor v. Scobee,1 74 there may be
technical questions as to the need for immediate action and the risks
of delay or the effect of shock of a second operation which will
require medical expert testimony There is considerable support for
the proposition that medical expert testimony is most difficult to
obtain in malpractice cases, particularly testimony favorable to the
plaintiff.1 75 The reasons for hesitancy on the part of doctors have
been explored recently by several authorities.1 7 0 Such problems as
the expense in time and money of testifying and the reluctance of
doctors to subject themselves to the ordeal of cross-examination may
be overcome by greater cooperation on the part of both the medical
and legal professions in establishing fair witness fees and making
provisions for calling medical witnesses at times which will be
reasonably convenient for both the witness and the court.17 One
172. 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W 444, 76 A.L.R. 551 (1931)
173. 244 Mich. 226, 221 N.W 168 (1928), discussed p. 416 supro.
174. 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1952), discussed p. 410 supra.
175. See, e.g., Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 258, 288 P.2d 1003,
1010 (1955), Huffman v. Lundquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 483, 234 P.2d 34, 46, 29
A.L.R. 2d 485, 500 (1951) (dissenting opinion by Carter, J.), Tadlock v.
Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 44, 173 Pac. 200, 202 (1918) , Johnson v. Winston, 68
Neb. 425, 430, 94 N.W 607, 609 (1903). But see Coleman v. McCarthy, 53
R.I. 266, 267-68, 165 Atl. 900, 901 (1933), saying that plaintiff's counsel's
statement that he was unable to get a medical expert to testify is "startling"
and if true "is a matter of grave concern to those charged with the administration of justice." See also the somewhat less disinterested statements in 10
NACCA L.J. 257 (1952), 11 NACCA L.J. 172 (1953)
176. See, e.g., Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied. The Silent
Medical Treatment, 1 Villanova L. Rev. 250 (1956) , Hall, Let's Understand
Each Other, 42 Ill. B.J. 690 (1954) , Comment, Torts-Malpractice-Medico-

legal Relations-Expert Testimony, 2 Villanova L. Rev. 95 (1956).
177 Some work in this area has been done through the drawing up of a
proposed Code of Inter-Professional Conduct, by a joint committee of the
Bar Association and Medical Associations of Ramsey County, Minnesota.
See also 26 Cleveland B.A.J. 167 (1955) , 28 Wis. B. Bull. 10 (Aug. 1955) for
reports of similar activity in other states.
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problelh which is not emphasized by the Villanova survey""8 on why
doctors are unwilling to testify, but which the present author
believes plays a large part in developing such unwillingness on the
part of many doctors, is the difficulty of defimng what is "reasonable
and proper medical practice." Where the defendant doctor has not
committed an obvious violation of the medical standards of conduct,
many doctors appear to be unwilling to criticize what may prove in
the long run to be proper practice. There is sufficient variation in
methods of treatment and operation, and sufficient difficult), in describing in words the actual conditions obtaining at the time of
the operation so that doctors may themselves be uncertain as to
what they would do under the circumstances. Perhaps the answer
is to allow the medical witnesses to make as complete examinations
of the patient, the hospital records and reports of the operating
surgeon as they feel are necessary and then permit them wide
leeway in preparing their testimony and delivering it without interruption by counsel in the form of questions and objections until the
report is given. Perhaps more reliance on "neutral" witnesses appointed by the court, with the approval of both parties,'" will tend
to solve some of these problems. Two other existing solutions to the
problems deserve mention: the "Minnesota plan" whereby questions of deviations from the truth by medical witnesses are referred
to special committees of the medical and legal professions,"'0 and
the use in Massachusetts'' and Nevada' 82 of medical treatises as a
substitute for the medical witness. Mr. Melvin Belli has recently
raised still another question, that of the influence of malpractice
insurance companies in deterring doctors from taking the stand.'"
The ultimate solution of this question, along with the others raised
here, will depend on the combined efforts of the two professions,
but does not seem an impossible goal.
Pending such solution, it may be possible to give the protection
necessary to plaintiffs by imposing a burden upon the defendant
doctor to come forward with an explanation of his conduct where
178. Comment, Torts- Malpractice- 3fedicolegal Relations - Expert
Testimny, 2 Villanova L. Rev. 95 (1956).
179. This is possible under such statutory provisions as Cal. Code Civ.
Proc. Ann. § 1871 (West 1955).
180. Regan, Doctor and Patient and the Law 203 (3d ed. 1956). For
the views pro and con on the Minnesota plan, see Marcus, The Minnesota
Plan--A Study of Cross Purposes, 6 Law. Guild Rev. 648 (1946), Slobe,
The Minnesota Plan.--Another View, 7 Law. Guild Rev. 227 (1947).
181. Mass. Stat. 1949 c. 233 § 49; Thomas v. Ellis, 329 Mass. 93, 106
N.E.2d 687 (1952).
182. Nev. Stat. 1953 c. 100 § 1.
183. Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent .I edicaL
Treatment, 1 Villanova L. Rev. 250 (1956).
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the plaintiff has shown that the operation exceeded the smpe of
consent. Such a "presumption" probably has sound basis in the
normal practice of doctors of not performing operations without
obtaining consent.
CONCLUSION

As a general proposition, it may be said that when a doctor
undertakes to perform an operation or render medical treatment to
a patient, without first having obtained the understanding consent
of the patient, he will be treated as having committed an assault
and battery There are, however, provisions for emergency treatment, and a large number of courts have varied from the "assault
and battery" classification in applying the statute of limitations. The
cases in which this problem of classification and imposition of
liability have arisen present a wide variety of factual problems
some of which deserve severe treatment, others of which appear
to be little more than a minor deviation from the standards of good
practice if that.
The author concludes that the trial and decision of these unauthorized operation cases would be greatly improved in terms
of consistency of theory and appropriateness of liability if there
were a single basis for liability in all malpractice cases, other than
the occasional instance of an actual assault and battery in the sense
of an intentional deviation from practice which does not tend to be
beneficial to the patient. The basis of liability should be deviation
from the standard of conduct of a reasonable and prudent doctor
of the same school of practice as the defendant under similar circumstances. The author believes that under such a standard the
patient will be properly protected by the medical profession's own
recognition of its obligation to maintain its standards. One particular obligation which the law may properly exact or impose,
however, is the obligation of a doctor to make a reasonable disclosure to the patient of the nature of his illness or infirmity, the
nature of the treatment proposed and the danger of using such
treatment or alternative treatment, and then permit the patient to
decide whether to submit to the treatment or not. To overcome any
difficulties of proof, the law may also properly create a presumption
that where the patient has not given express consent to the operation or treatment, there has been a deviation from the standard of
proper medical care, which presumption will impose upon the doctor
the onus of coming forward with justification of his conduct by the
use of qualified medical evidence.

